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ABSTRACT 
  If an agency newly declares that it lacks statutory power previously 
claimed, how should such a move—what this Article calls agency 
statutory abnegation—be reviewed? Given the array of strategies an 
agency might use to make a policy change or move the law in a 
deregulatory direction, why might statutory abnegation be chosen? 
After all, it is always a perilous and likely doctrinally disadvantageous 
strategy for agencies. Nonetheless, agencies from time to time have 
utilized statutory abnegation as justification for deregulatory shifts. 
Actions by agencies during 2017 and 2018, under the administration of 
President Donald J. Trump, reveal an especially prevalent use of such 
statutory abnegation. This Article explains the agency statutory-
abnegation strategy, illustrating its variants with review of past and 
recent uses. It then distinguishes statutory abnegation from agency 
actions and explanations that might appear to manifest or permit such 
a strategy but actually involve doctrinally different and less problematic 
settings. Then, after distilling the key elements of doctrines governing 
agency policy change, or what is sometimes referred to as consistency 
doctrine, it reviews procedural and analytical hurdles agencies must 
surmount to succeed in a policy change. It explores how analysis of this 
strategic move reveals the inadequacy of—or perhaps the naïve, 
publicly interested optimism behind—prevalent theories and linked 
normative claims about agency incentives, judicial roles, and political 
accountability. The Article closes by analyzing the persistent judicial 
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rejection of such strategies and the underlying normative vision they 
reflect about the balance of law and politics in the administrative state. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction .......................................................................................... 1511 
I.  Agency Statutory Abnegation, Defined and Distinguished ....... 1517 
A. Statutory-Abnegation Examples ...................................... 1519 
B. Statutory-Abnegation Variants and Differences ............ 1537 
1. Deregulatory Benefits ..................................................... 1537 
2. Omitted Comparative Analysis of Legal Reasoning and 
Effects............................................................................. 1538 
3. A Textualist Narrative and Word-Driven Choice ........ 1538 
4. Initial Declinations to Act, Distinguished ..................... 1540 
5. Chevron Policy Change, Distinguished ........................ 1541 
6. Changed Regulatory Stringency, Distinguished ........... 1541 
7. Past Abnegation, Effects on Future Regulatory  
 Action, and the “Major Questions” Canon ................ 1542 
II.  The Doctrinal Answer to Statutory Abnegation ........................ 1543 
A. Assessing Proffered Justifications for Statutory 
Abnegation ......................................................................... 1543 
1. Presidential Edicts and Direction .................................. 1544 
2. Change and Chevron...................................................... 1545 
3. Litigation Risk ................................................................ 1546 
4. Consistency Doctrine’s Constraints .............................. 1547 
B. The Doctrinal Disadvantages of Abnegation ................. 1554 
III.  Rationalizing the Statutory-Abnegation Strategy, and  
  Normative Concerns ................................................................. 1562 
A. Abnegation as a Surrender or Expansion of Agency 
Power ................................................................................... 1563 
B. Political-Economic Theory and Abnegation .................. 1566 
1. A Long-Shot but Worthwhile Risk ............................... 1567 
2. Changing Policy-Change Doctrine ............................... 1568 
3. Political and Career Regulator Tensions ...................... 1570 
4. Political Benefits Even if Vulnerable to Judicial  
 Rejection ........................................................................ 1573 
C. Abnegation, Politicized Regulation, and Political 
Accountability’s Forms ...................................................... 1576 
D. Judicial Enforcement of the Agency Obligation to 
Engage ................................................................................. 1582 
E. The “Why Bother” Rationale for Abnegation ............... 1588 
Conclusion ............................................................................................. 1591 
BUZBEE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  4:08 PM 
2019] AGENCY STATUTORY ABNEGATION 1511 
INTRODUCTION 
Late in the administration of President Barack Obama, the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) promulgated final 
regulations constraining greenhouse-gas pollution from power plants, 
regulating refurbished trucks, and dealing with pollution from oil and 
gas extraction, among many other areas.1 Likewise, the Department of 
Agriculture newly regulated livestock-handling practices. Immigration 
authorities took actions shielding immigrants from legal jeopardy or 
imminent deportation. Early in the administration of President Donald 
J. Trump, however, these agencies and numerous others not only 
sought to reverse course and roll back these actions but did so with a 
previously rare rationale. Contrary to these agencies’ earlier claims of 
power and extensive legal and factual justifications, these same 
regulators now claimed, in a deregulatory mode, that the underlying 
statutes precluded those previous actions. The exact wording of such 
disclaimers of power varied slightly—for example, the form of 
regulation “exceeded [our] proper role and authority,”2 or was 
“contrary to the plain language of the [statute],”3 or was rooted in 
“implausible” claims of statutory power,4 or was illegal because the 
agency’s prior justification “rewr[ote] unambiguous statutory terms.”5 
But again and again, these agencies did not merely seek to adjust 
policy; they newly declared a diminished view of their own statutorily 
conferred powers. 
When an agency newly declares that it lacks statutory power 
previously claimed, how should such a move—what this Article calls 
agency statutory abnegation—be reviewed? Does such a rationale for a 
surrender of agency power, as well as the usual accompanying reversal 
of policy views, change what courts should demand of agencies 
pursuing a policy change? Should the generally deregulatory valence 
of such statutory abnegation trigger different agency justification 
burdens and judicial expectations? Given the array of strategies an 
agency might use to make a policy change or move the law in a 
 
 1. These actions are discussed infra Part I. 
 2. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,042 (Oct. 16, 2017) (Proposed Rule) 
[hereinafter CPP Repeal Proposal] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see also infra notes 69, 123 
and accompanying text.  
 3. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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deregulatory direction, why might statutory abnegation be chosen? 
After all, as explored below, it is always a perilous and likely 
doctrinally disadvantageous strategy for agencies. Furthermore, if it is 
relied upon to the neglect of other justificatory rationales that 
administrative-law doctrine requires, then policy change sought 
through statutory abnegation faces likely rejection in the courts. 
Several well-established propositions about agency power both 
illuminate and raise questions about the statutory-abnegation 
deregulatory strategy. Agencies will ordinarily receive deference in 
their interpretations of laws they administer, and statutory abnegation 
involves, at its core, agency statutory interpretation.6 And, similarly, 
when agencies assess societal conditions and their own resources and 
decide how zealously to pursue their statutory tasks, they will also 
receive deference and sometimes almost no judicial scrutiny.7 In 
addition, agencies are seldom ordered to regulate in a particular way; 
most statutes leave agencies latitude to make pragmatic judgments 
about regulatory choices, even when they are rooted in some required, 
statutorily provided criteria.8 Moreover, modern cases seem to grant a 
“plus” factor to regulatory approaches that harness market 
mechanisms, are sensitive to costs and benefits, or provide regulatory 
targets or states handling regulatory implementation with flexibility.9 
And, by definition, the agency statutory-abnegation claims analyzed 
here involve agency policy changes; long-established law states that an 
agency’s initial regulatory views are not frozen in stone. Policy change 
is not legally suspect.10 
 
 6. See infra notes 136–37, Part II.A.2, and Part II.B, and accompanying text (discussing 
deference doctrines and abnegation); see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293 (2016) (discussing numerous deference regimes and latitude for 
policy changes with new administrations). 
 7. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text (discussing judicial deference to initial 
agency inaction and its relation to abnegation). 
 8. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. 471, 483 (2011) (observing that agencies creating and revising policies usually have 
latitude for a “range of choices”). 
 9. See William W. Buzbee, Federalism-Facilitated Regulatory Innovation and Regression in 
a Time of Environmental Legislative Gridlock, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 451, 474–75 (2016) 
(discussing cases providing such sympathetic review). 
 10. William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in 
Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1366–68, 1392–1401 (2018) [hereinafter Buzbee, The 
Tethered President] (discussing the expectation of agency policy adjustments and the law 
governing such changes, with a focus on the centrality of comparative attention to facts and 
reasoning in pursuing a change). 
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These propositions about agency power and judicial review might, 
upon a superficial initial analysis, seem to lead next to the logical 
proposition that agencies should be granted broad latitude to engage 
in statutory abnegation. However, the line of cases that collectively 
create the body of consistency doctrine squarely rejects any argument 
for less rigorous judicial review.11 This is not to claim that abnegation 
is itself illegal; it is possible that an agency could correctly self-identify 
a past illegal claim of power. As analyzed below, however, the 
statutory-abnegation rationale for a policy rollback or change is 
unusual and generally disadvantageous. Further, in the context of 
recent regulatory rollbacks, abnegation claims have been accompanied 
by little agency effort to comply with longstanding precepts of 
administrative law and judicial expectations guiding agency actions—
especially doctrine guiding agency policy change. Moreover, 
abnegation strategies have tended to involve settings where, if the 
agency’s claimed lack of power is correct and the agency does not 
proffer rationales rooted in its expertise, the agency receives zero 
deference. Agencies can pursue policy change and may, at times, even 
have room to rely on statutory abnegation as part of such policy shifts. 
But consistency doctrine and a web of related law reject—or at least 
seem to reject—the legal adequacy of an agency policy change rooted 
in statutory abnegation that relies only on a new and power-shrinking 
legal interpretation to justify the shift. The “no power whatsoever” 
variant of statutory abnegation might possibly tempt reviewing courts 
to demand less of agencies, but this variant, which is discussed below, 
would be rare. Upon closer analysis, it also fails to persuasively justify 
abandonment of, or a carveout from, prevailing analytical and 
procedural obligations required for agency policy change.12 
Nonetheless, agencies from time to time have utilized statutory-
abnegation claims as part of their justification for deregulatory shifts. 
The George W. Bush administration sought to justify its policy change 
and inaction on climate change with an abnegation claim.13 Agency 
actions under the Trump administration have revealed an especially 
prevalent use of such statutory-abnegation strategies.14 They are often 
explained, at least in part, as undertaken to comply with overtly 
 
 11. See id. (illustrating the standards developed for statutory abnegation); see also infra Part 
II.A.4 (applying these cases to abnegation strategies); see also infra Part III.D (reviewing cases 
rejecting the adequacy of agency actions relying on abnegation-based deregulation).  
 12. See infra Part III.E (discussing this issue). 
 13. See infra notes 32–41, 204 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Part I.A. 
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deregulatory executive orders or to conform to the policy preferences 
of the president. Courts reviewing past and recent statutory-
abnegation claims, however, have generally rejected such policy shifts, 
finding the actions legally inadequate and inconsistent with doctrinal 
hurdles.15 They have refused to review statutory abnegation with any 
lessened burden of agency justification. 
This Article explains the agency statutory-abnegation strategy, 
illustrating its variants with review of past and recent uses. It then 
distinguishes statutory-abnegation claims from agency actions and 
explanations that might appear to manifest or permit such a strategy, 
but that actually involve doctrinally different and less problematic 
settings. Then, after distilling the key elements of consistency doctrine 
that governs judicial review of agency policy change, it reviews 
procedural and analytical hurdles agencies must surmount to succeed 
in a policy change. These cases, plus other foundational administrative-
law cases like Chevron,16 undoubtedly give agencies room to pursue 
policy changes. But these cases repeatedly affirm and explain doctrinal 
steps that agencies must follow when and if they seek to change policy, 
and agencies have neglected or only glancingly addressed many of 
these hurdles in advancing their statutory-abnegation claims.17 This 
disjuncture between doctrinal hurdles and minimal agency 
justifications for policy changes explains why such agency actions, 
including statutory-abnegation claims, have often met with failure. 
But this doctrinal disadvantage makes the statutory-abnegation 
strategy all the more puzzling. If—as is true—bare statutory-
abnegation claims often weaken agency power over targets of 
regulation, reduce agency discretion, are doctrinally disadvantageous, 
and appear destined in most instances for eventual judicial rejection, 
why might agencies nonetheless persist in utilizing such a strategy? The 
recent prevalence of this strategic move reveals the inadequacy of—or 
perhaps the naïve, publicly interested optimism behind—prevalent 
theories and linked normative claims about agency incentives, judicial 
roles, and political accountability. 
 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 17. As explained below, abnegation claims can involve complete disavowal of power to 
occupy a regulatory area at all, or a narrower claim that a past assertion of authority or a particular 
regulatory action was legally precluded. Abnegation is not asserted if an agency is merely claiming 
it has found a better way to regulate or it thinks the past action is vulnerable to being held 
arbitrary and capricious. See infra Part I. 
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This Article’s analysis reveals often neglected risks posed by 
politically influenced regulatory actions, especially if linked to the 
president. Statutory-abnegation strategies often reflect obeisance to 
the president or executive-branch political appointees’ preferences, 
but at the price of undercutting or ignoring equally if not more 
important sources of regulatory legitimacy and political accountability. 
Agencies utilizing this strategy have offered slender legal reasoning, 
paid little attention to statutory criteria, avoided past rationales, and 
shown little or no engagement with on-the-ground impacts of the old 
and new policy choices. Current doctrine gives agencies no space to 
dodge comparative analysis of such “contingencies”—namely, the 
science, data, empirical assessments, and old and new legal reasoning 
relevant to evaluating the policy shift.18 Politicized justifications and 
actions that are likely motivated by electoral advantage or hierarchical 
obedience to political leadership, but which disregard statutory 
requirements and these doctrinally created hurdles, come at a 
considerable cost in the form of lost political accountability. 
This statutory-abnegation strategy does, however, fit within 
political-economic theories that call for analysis of regulatory 
structures and actions with attention to all players’ regulatory 
incentives. In particular, abnegation-based strategies may be a 
knowing attempt to downplay expert or technocratic roles shaped by 
statutory process and criteria, on the one hand, and politically sensitive 
or motivated policymaking and interest-group entreaties on the other. 
Situating this move and its apparent rationales within this political-
economic literature, especially positive political theory, illuminates the 
appeal for statutory-abnegation proponents, at least in some political-
economic environments, of this losing legal strategy.19 By viewing 
abnegating agencies and presidents as acting in a political and legally 
constrained environment that is dynamic and involves regulatory 
actors’ interactions, this puzzling strategy becomes easier to 
understand.20 Agency actions lacking legal merit may reflect not legal 
error, but rather the knowing pursuit of electoral benefits. Agencies, 
 
 18. I explore the role of such contingencies in the body of consistency doctrine and how they 
constrain and shape efforts to change policy in Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10. 
 19. For two articles distilling and setting forth early core attributes of positive political theory 
(“PPT”), see generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip A. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory 
in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 462–63 (1991) and Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political 
Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 43–51 (1994).  
 20. Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 6 (identifying these variables as the core enrichment of the 
rational-actor theory provided by PPT). 
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and presidents under whom they serve, can generate substantial 
electoral and perhaps political-party benefits through statutory-
abnegation claims and repeatedly touted deregulatory and policy-
reversal efforts, even if illegal, largely symbolic, and providing only 
transitory relief. Courts, however, with their focus on the law and the 
need for justified, “reasoned decisionmaking” by agencies, have 
emphasized the procedural and legal inadequacies of agency statutory-
abnegation claims. Some degree of policy change will usually be 
possible, but courts are likely to—and should—continue to force 
agencies to hew to statutory criteria and procedures, full engagement 
with the new and old actions’ legal and factual underpinnings and 
reasoning, and burdens of justification.21 This body of consistency 
doctrine integrates and reflects respect for the multiple forms of 
political accountability that remain central to the legality and 
legitimacy of the administrative state. Giving politically or 
presidentially induced regulatory reversals some major “plus” when 
reviewed in court would reward actions that may intentionally 
disregard the substantive and procedural choices of Congress, as 
reflected in statutes. It would also run afoul of enduring judicial 
doctrines governing agencies seeking to make a deregulatory policy 
change. 
Part I defines statutory abnegation, reviews agency uses of this 
strategy, and distinguishes it from several other ways agencies may 
seek to change policy or achieve deregulatory ends. Part II assesses 
agency statutory abnegation from a doctrinal perspective, showing how 
its recent uses have generally flunked doctrinal requirements for 
agencies hoping to achieve a policy change. Part III explores why 
agency abnegation might nonetheless be pursued and may even be a 
rational choice when viewed through the lens of political benefits. 
However, abnegation will often be destined for legal defeat because 
the agency either incorrectly interpreted the relevant statute or failed 
to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and 
consistency doctrine. But long before then, presidents, responsive 
agencies, and regulatory targets favoring deregulation may see 
 
 21. As observed by Professor Seidenfeld, agencies will always be influenced by politics, but 
review of their actions does, and must, focus on legality in light of underlying science, facts, data, 
and reasoning. Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 144–45 (2012); see also Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics 
in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 6–8 (2009) (expressing sympathy for a “place 
for politics” in regulatory policymaking, but stating that evidence and statutory criteria limit room 
for presidential influence). 
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multiple benefits of such unlawfully pursued policy changes. This Part 
closes by exploring the multiple forms of political accountability that 
normally constrain agencies and that, when ignored by agencies, have 
led reviewing courts to reject actions rooted in abnegation claims. 
I.  AGENCY STATUTORY ABNEGATION, DEFINED AND 
DISTINGUISHED 
Administrative agencies engage in a multitude of actions in several 
different modes, most of which involve some degree of policymaking. 
Modern agency policymaking occurs through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking; issuance of guidance and other policy documents without 
the notice-and-comment process; and enforcement actions, linked 
adjudications, and resulting orders.22 In all of these settings, agencies 
both apply procedural and substantive policy choices set by Congress 
in enabling legislation, and implement and often adjust agency-set 
policies.23 Some agency actions truly just involve applying policy 
previously set by Congress or the agency, but some degree of policy 
creation, choice, and change is a common and unexceptional 
occurrence.24 In any of these procedural modes, an agency can reveal a 
 
 22. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 
1386–90 (2004) (reviewing the law granting agencies latitude to choose procedurally how to make 
policy). 
 23. For analyses of agency latitude for policy change and consistency doctrine, see Buzbee, 
The Tethered President, supra note 10 (analyzing the need for agencies to address contingencies 
underlying old and new actions and discussing arrays of influences shaping consistency doctrine); 
Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1029–30 (2005) (examining 
procedural modes generating old and new policies); Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, 
Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 115 (2011) (analyzing latitude for agency policy 
change and distinguishing between “expository” policy declarations rooted in language and 
“prescriptive” reasoning based on policy choices, and arguing for different levels of judicial 
scrutiny in light of the change mode); see also Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 783–88 (2017) (analyzing agencies’ errors about their 
authority, possible motivations, and judicial responses under the Prill doctrine, Prill v. NLRB, 755 
F.2d 941, 956–57 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Hemel and Nielson are not focused on agencies denying 
themselves powers or agency reversals about their views, as is this Article, but they offer insights 
into agency motivations and values served by current doctrine rejecting actions founded on errors 
regarding agency power. They disagree with scholars questioning the value of such remands to 
agencies requiring them to act based on a correct understanding of their power. See id. at 760–62 
(responding to a discussion of Prill claims from Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in 
Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 253, 296–301 (2017)). 
 24. See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1359–70 (2012) [hereinafter Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common 
Law] (comparing agencies’ and courts’ institutional competence and administrative law’s 
development in a common law–like manner); see also O’Connell, supra note 8, at 479–86 
(analyzing political transitions and resulting agency regulatory changes). 
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policy change based on statutory abnegation. This Part introduces 
agency statutory abnegation and distinguishes it from other sorts of 
agency actions. 
Agency statutory-abnegation strategies have occasionally been 
asserted in the past, most famously by EPA during the George W. Bush 
administration leading to the Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts 
v. EPA.25 But agency statutory-abnegation claims became increasingly 
prevalent during 2017 and 2018 in an array of rapidly rolled out 
deregulatory actions and policy shifts by numerous agencies.26 Many of 
these shifts are explained as part of agency responses to Executive 
Order 13,771, issued by President Trump, that calls for agencies to 
eliminate two regulations for each new regulation, plus ensure that 
regulatory actions result in no new net costs.27 Some such actions 
followed more specific presidential orders or memoranda, while others 
emerged from agencies with no advance public involvement of the 
White House.28 
In its strongest form, agency statutory abnegation has the 
following attributes. Acting against a backdrop of unchanged statutory 
law, an agency reexamines its powers under that law. In a break from 
past agency power claims and, usually, related actions, the agency 
newly declares that it no longer has authority it previously asserted.29 
This is an act of agency “abnegation”—self-denial of authority—
because, without any statutory or judicially mandated change, the 
agency is denying itself statutory power previously claimed. 
Agencies have utilized these statutory-abnegation strategies in 
several different forms. In abnegation’s most unadorned, bare form, an 
agency reverses an action or policy and explains the reversal as 
compelled by its new view that it lacks (and earlier lacked) the 
authority previously claimed. Other forms of abnegation can be less 
boldly asserted; many make a limited claim of a particular past 
overreach or of a constrained set of regulatory options. Others are 
accompanied by a fallback claim of a mere preference for a different 
statutory interpretation. 
 
 25. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 26. See infra Part I.A (reviewing such uses). 
 27. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).  
 28. See infra Part I.A (reviewing an array of abnegation actions and discussing responses to 
regulation-specific presidential memoranda or orders). 
 29. As reviewed in Parts I.A and I.B, abnegation claims can be utilized in all modes through 
which agencies make policy, namely through rulemakings, through litigation and other 
adjudicatory actions, and in guidance or policy documents. 
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But abnegation is quite different from the more standard agency 
proffer of a different policy that is described as also an option under 
existing law.30 In that more typical setting, the agency asserts that 
statutory language provides room for context-specific agency exercise 
of discretion and, in light of new assessment of facts, science, and 
regulatory options, gives the agency room to choose from several 
reasonable policy choices.31 Often both the old policy and the new 
policy are presented as permissible options, at least as a matter of 
language. With statutory abnegation, in contrast, an agency is denying 
it had statutory power to act as it did in the past and is disavowing 
future assertion of such power. This Part now analyzes a cross section 
of examples of agency policy changes rooted in statutory abnegation 
and then distinguishes variants of abnegation and other agency policy-
change strategies. 
A. Statutory-Abnegation Examples 
Perhaps the most famous example of agency abnegation occurred 
in the agency actions leading to the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v. 
EPA decision rejecting EPA’s declination to regulate greenhouse-gas 
emissions (“GHGs”).32 EPA had not regulated GHGs, but two general 
counsel had previously written memoranda and provided responses to 
congressional inquiries that declared EPA had such authority.33 When 
the administration of President George W. Bush denied a petition to 
regulate GHGs from motor vehicles, it offered an array of justifications 
for its statutory-abnegation conclusion.34 Some rationales related to 
presidential authority and discretion regarding policy priorities, but its 
primary claim was that it could not regulate GHGs as an “air pollutant” 
despite the Clean Air Act’s broad statutory language.35 Breaking from 
 
 30. The general assumption is that agencies will prefer statutory interpretations that 
preserve their discretionary powers. Hemel & Nielson, supra note 23, at 762 (reviewing 
scholarship making this assumption); see also Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 
Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5–6, 
24–28, 31–38, 71–72 (2017) [hereinafter Metzger, 1930s Redux] (reviewing and challenging claims 
about inappropriate uses of discretion or excess agency power). 
 31. This was the setting of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 853–66 (1984) (reviewing the history of EPA’s approaches and reasons for its 
judicially upheld policy change). Neither the agency nor the Supreme Court viewed the agency’s 
new policy as mandatory or its old views as illegal. Id. at 842. 
 32. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510–16 (2007) (reviewing this history). 
 33. Id. at 510–11. 
 34. Id. at 511–15 (reviewing the Bush administration’s denial rationales). 
 35. Id. 
BUZBEE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  4:08 PM 
1520  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1509 
its earlier general counsel’s memoranda, EPA—under its new 
statutory-abnegation view—said the statute had a different, more local 
focus and that Congress could not have intended regulation of a gas 
generally not perceived as a pollutant and that caused effects on a 
global scale.36 Much of its analysis and legal argument relied on FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,37 asserting that EPA could not 
claim such economically significant authority without a clearer 
delegation from Congress.38 EPA did not analyze the effects of its 
declination to act, but because the past EPA claims of power had not 
been accompanied by regulatory actions subject to some new rollback, 
the agency did not have effects of past and new actions to compare.39 
As further analyzed below, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. 
EPA rejected the agency’s new statutory-abnegation claim and the 
agency’s reliance on presidential and administrative prerogatives to 
make politically related choices about resource priorities. The Court 
stated that the agency had to decide whether to act based on statutory 
criteria, as construed by the Court.40 And the Court called for agency 
analysis of underlying science and climate-change effects in light of 
those statutory criteria.41 
Statutory abnegation became common in a wave of 2017 and 2018 
deregulatory actions by agencies under the Trump administration. 
Many of these abnegation claims were accompanied by little or no 
engagement with facts, science, studies, or findings previously viewed 
as relevant to regulatory decisions. Further, they often provided only 
summary engagement with the agencies’ own earlier, contrary legal 
views and included little analysis of on-the-ground effects likely to 
result from the claimed lack of power. The abnegation claims are, for 
purposes of this Article, separate from the absence of accompanying 
analysis and justifications; it appears, however, that avoidance of this 
considerable burden may partly explain agencies’ reliance on 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 38. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 
52,924–25 (Sept. 8, 2003) (Notice of denial of petition for rulemaking); see also Massachusetts, 549 
U.S. at 511–13 (discussing EPA’s position).  
 39. As discussed below, under the State Farm case, an agency that changes its policy needs 
to fully address rationales, compare past and current facts, and justify its change. See Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48–49 (1983). In 
Massachusetts, there were contrary interpretations of the Clean Air Act but no past regulation of 
GHGs or effects to assess.  
 40. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528–33. 
 41. Id. at 528–36. 
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abnegation claims.42 Although recent agency statutory-abnegation 
actions are many, a substantial but partial sample is described here, 
including analysis of some of the most visible, politically salient 
actions.43 A few others resulting in court decisions are discussed at the 
close of the Article, including the many judicial rejections of Trump-
administration policy shifts utilizing variants of abnegation claims. 
For example, in the immigration arena, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) in 2018 ended the Temporary Protected 
Status (“TPS”) of immigrants from El Salvador and Haiti living in the 
United States.44 In doing so, however, DHS not only changed its 
longstanding interpretation of the underlying statute to justify the 
revocations, it also—in another breach of agency policy-change 
obligations—failed to acknowledge that shift or to address additional 
risks to immigrant safety that it had earlier viewed as legally relevant 
to TPS status.45 It is hence unclear if DHS was aware of the policy 
 
 42. As discussed infra Part III.B, agencies interested in quick and potentially enduring 
deregulatory change may see several political benefits if their use of abnegation proves successful. 
But an agency could claim it lacks statutory power and still provide analysis comporting with the 
requirements of consistency doctrine. See infra Part II (exploring the doctrinal answer to 
abnegation strategies both if used alone and if used with the agency analysis required by 
consistency doctrine). Part III explores why courts have rejected abnegation claims and soundly 
still require agencies making abnegation claims to provide the comparative analysis required by 
consistency doctrine. The key elements of consistency doctrine as set forth in Supreme Court 
cases are discussed infra in Part II.A.4. 
 43. See, e.g., Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration is 
Constantly Losing in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/the-real-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losing-in-court/2019/03/ 
19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html?utm_term=.c9d7ba8b8e5f [https:// 
perma.cc/9ZD8-9D78] (describing court reticence to permit “virtually unexplained” deregulatory 
policy changes across government agencies).  
 44. Compare DHS Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected 
Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,645, 44,645–47 (July 8, 2016) (Notice) (extending TPS due to safety risks 
from an initial TPS-triggering earthquake event but noting other statutorily specified sources of 
safety risks to explain extending this status), with Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen M. Nielson Announcement on Temporary Protected 
Status for El Salvador (Jan. 8, 2018) (announcing termination of TPS designation because the 
“original conditions . . . no longer exist” and stating, therefore, that “under the applicable statute, 
the current TPS designation must be terminated”); compare DHS Termination of the Designation 
of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 2648, 2650 (Jan. 18, 2018) (Notice) 
(terminating TPS because “the conditions for Haiti’s designation . . . relating to the 2010 
earthquake . . . are no longer met” and limiting analysis to the effects of that one event), with 
DHS Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 23,830, 
23,831–32 (May 24, 2017) (Notice) (extending TPS and discussing lingering earthquake effects as 
well as other risks to safety, including other storm events, agricultural harvest problems, a weak 
public health system, a cholera epidemic, lack of safe water, extreme poverty, corruption, and 
government instability). 
 45. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Agencies making a policy change are required 
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change it was making. In 2018, it stated that it “must” return TPS 
immigrants when the original triggering condition ends; under previous 
administrations, and even in two early Trump-administration actions, 
the agency considered all of the criteria that can justify TPS eligibility 
in deciding whether to continue TPS, not just the initial triggering 
event.46 In asserting that it “must” return émigrés due to the 
termination of safety risks caused by the initial triggering event, and in 
accompanying statements that the “law does not allow” consideration 
of other conditions, DHS did not discuss what would happen to these 
former TPS designees upon return to their countries.47 Statutorily 
specified categories of risk that had earlier justified TPS extensions 
were, in 2018, apparently no longer viewed as relevant.48 
In a more visible action that also linked to President Trump’s 
campaign promises to take a harder line on immigration, in 2017 the 
administration, through a legal opinion of the Attorney General and 
action by DHS, declared it would abandon the Obama administration’s 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program.49 
DACA was not a finalized notice-and-comment regulation but instead 
a factually and legally explained policy of regulatory forbearance that 
DHS claimed was permissible under relevant statutory and 
 
to declare such a change and justify it; they cannot silently make a policy change or consistently 
vacillate in a way reflecting the absence of any policy. See Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra 
note 10, at 1401–03 (discussing these agency policy-change obligations and metarules).  
 46. DHS Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 
at 23, 831–32 (considering chronic public-health and governmental issues beyond the scope of the 
natural-disaster damage). For further review of this regulatory history in a challenge to the 
revocation of TPS for Haitians, see Complaint, NAACP v. U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-100239-MJG, 2018 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2018). 
 47. See Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1090–91 (N.D. Cal. 2018) [Ramos II] (opining 
that DHS had not acknowledged its “substantive and highly consequential” policy shift in 
“eliminating consideration of intervening conditions not directly related to the originating 
condition”). 
 48. This change in agency practice and the policy change it reflected resulted in two court 
decisions indicating, in preliminary rulings on a motion to dismiss and then for a preliminary 
injunction, that these unacknowledged policy shifts were likely illegal under the APA due to how 
they did not disclose and explain the policy shift. See Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1108 
(N.D. Cal. 2018) [Ramos I] (“[A]gencies ‘may not . . . depart from a prior policy sub silentio or 
simply disregard rules that are still on the books,’ and ‘must show that there are good reasons for 
the new policy.’” (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009))); Ramos 
II at 1089–90 (quoting Ramos I’s discussion of APA constraints on agencies’ ability to change 
policy).  
 49. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 
1025–26 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (reviewing the history of the enactment and subsequent abandonment 
of the DACA program). 
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administrative law.50 This program provided long-term immigrants 
who had arrived as children and lacked a criminal record with a general 
policy of enforcement forbearance and a path to employment without 
risk to the immigrants—often referred to as “Dreamers”—or risk to 
employers of DACA beneficiaries.51 The Obama administration 
justified this program with reference to precedents supporting such 
agency forbearance and prioritization of activities, as well as statutory 
language providing this latitude.52 And in explaining the policy, the 
administration discussed the children’s plight and argued that DACA 
would be sound policy and comply with the law.53 
In its 2017 reversal, DHS relied only on a brief Attorney General 
statement rooted substantially in constitutional notions that DACA 
was illegal.54 The agency did not engage with the policy or factual 
underpinnings of the earlier policy, nor did it address doctrines 
previously relied upon to justify prioritizing enforcement against 
dangerous immigrants. By not justifying its shift with expertise-rooted 
rationales, DHS eliminated its strongest possible grounds for seeking 
judicial deference. This policy change, like several other 2017 and 2018 
agency actions that sidestepped the usual policy-change analytical 
hurdles, was judicially rejected in several substantially similar decisions 
for being rooted in legal error, lacking adequate explanation, and for 
flunking consistency doctrine in failing to fully engage with earlier 
factual considerations.55 This and other judicial analyses of abnegation-
based policy shifts are analyzed in greater depth below. 
 
 50. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH 
RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN 1 (2012) (“By this 
memorandum, I[, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano,] am setting forth how, in the 
exercise of our prosecutorial discretion, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should 
enforce the Nation’s immigration laws against certain young people . . . .”). 
 51. Id. at 1–3 (describing the DACA program). 
 52. See Regents, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1019–22 (describing exercises of deferred action by 
immigration officials prior to the DACA program, noting that such prosecutorial deference 
“began ‘without express statutory authorization’ but has since been recognized by the Supreme 
Court as a ‘regular practice,’” and has been explicitly referenced by Congress in legislation 
(quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999))).  
 53. Id.  
 54. See id. at 1025–26 (noting that the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision to 
rescind DACA was based on a short letter from Attorney General Jeff Sessions to the Secretary, 
opining that the program was an unconstitutional exercise of executive authority). 
 55. See, e.g., Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that the 
decision to rescind DACA “appear[ed] to be arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion” 
because it: (1) “rest[ed] on the erroneous legal conclusion that the DACA program is unlawful 
and unconstitutional”; (2) “rest[ed] on the erroneous factual premise that courts have determined 
that the DACA program violates the Constitution”; and (3) was “internally contradictory”); 
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EPA repeatedly utilized statutory-abnegation rationales in a 
series of 2017 and 2018 regulatory reversals. In late 2017, EPA 
proposed to repeal its Clean Power Plan (“CPP”).56 The CPP 
regulation was finalized in 2015 under the Obama administration and 
was designed to limit GHGs from power plants due to their climate 
impacts.57 The CPP was issued following three Supreme Court 
decisions that affirmed EPA authority to regulate GHGs, one of which 
specifically referenced the Clean Air Act provision—Section 111(d)—
as providing EPA authority to regulate existing power-plant 
emissions.58 Furthermore, EPA had, in a separate finalized and 
judicially upheld rulemaking, extensively documented climate science 
and associated health and environmental “endangerments” resulting 
from GHG emissions and climate change.59 That finding, plus the 
Court’s precedents, had been viewed by EPA as triggering a 
mandatory duty to regulate, due to “shall” language in Section 111(d).60 
It justified its consideration of power plants’ use of fuel shifts and 
trading strategies—sometimes referred to as “generation shifting” or 
regulating “beyond or outside the fenceline”—in setting its CPP 
 
Regents, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1037 (“[P]laintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that: (1) [DHS’s] 
decision to rescind DACA was based on a flawed legal premise; and (2) government counsel’s 
supposed ‘litigation risk’ rationale is a post hoc rationalization and would be, in any event, 
arbitrary and capricious.”).  
 56. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (Final Rule) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60) [hereinafter “Clean Power Plan”]. 
 57. Id. at 64,663. 
 58. See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423–25 (2011) (referring to 
EPA’s section 111(d) power to regulate power-plant greenhouse-gas emissions); William W. 
Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017 WISC. L. REV. 1037, 
1071–81 [hereinafter Buzbee, Federalism Hedging] (reviewing the cases and regulatory actions 
leading to the creation of the CPP). 
 59. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, supra note 58, at 1075 (reviewing the Endangerment 
Finding).  
 60. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 56, at 64,707–25 (summarizing the legal history and 
basis for the design of the CPP). In the CPP, EPA explained its approach as consistent with past 
rulemakings that required pollution control in light of each industries’ particular attributes. See 
id. at 64,703 (noting that previous section 111(d) actions were “necessarily geared toward the 
pollutants and industries regulated,” and stating that the present regulation similarly “tak[es] into 
account the particular characteristics of carbon pollution, the interconnected nature of the power 
sector and the manner in which EGUs [electric generating units] are currently operated”). It 
emphasized that power plants were already adjusting pollution levels through utilization of the 
integrated energy grid. See id. at 64,725 (noting that “fossil fuel-fired EGUs are taking actions to 
reduce emissions of both non-GHG air pollutants and GHGs” and that “[t]hese measures in 
aggregate result in the replacement of higher-emitting generation with lower- or zero-emitting 
generation, reflecting the integrated nature of the electricity system”). 
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pollution targets, due to EPA’s policy of considering the particular 
attributes of the industry being regulated.61 Since power plants operate 
in the setting of an interconnected and integrated grid and, under state-
law regimes, were already reducing GHG emissions and meeting 
energy demands cost-effectively through off-site strategies, EPA 
thought it should take them into account in devising the CPP.62 EPA 
also referenced the electric-power sector’s arguments in the mid-2000s 
that EPA, when potentially acting under Section 111(d) to regulate 
mercury emissions, could and should take into account such 
interconnectedness and the flexibility it provided.63 In early 2017, at the 
tail end of the Obama administration, EPA denied a series of petitions 
to reconsider the CPP.64 EPA looked at underlying conditions, trends, 
and costs, and it found that its CPP conclusions remained sound.65 EPA 
found that clean-energy trends had in fact accelerated more than 
expected and at lower cost than initially predicted in the CPP.66 
 
 61. See id. at 64,677 (discussing the interconnected grid system utilized by the power-utility 
sector); id. at 64,760–79 (justifying EPA’s ability to utilize the “beyond the source” approach using 
canons of statutory interpretation, and arguing that the power-utility sector’s reliance on the 
interconnected grid system warrants such an approach).  
 62. See id. at 64,761 (“[T]he EPA’s interpretation is . . . reasonable [in part 
because] . . . [f]ossil fuel-fired EGUs are already implementing the measures in [building blocks 
2 and 3] for various reasons, including for purposes of reducing CO2 emissions.”); see also Gabriel 
Pacyniak, Making the Most of Cooperative Federalism: What the Clean Power Plan Has Already 
Achieved, 29 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 301, 320–25, 334–40 (2017) (reviewing EPA’s statutory 
authority to enact the CPP, citing state commenters’ requests that the CPP build upon already 
existing state-level regulation, and discussing the importance of providing states and power plants 
with flexibility in implementing such regulation). 
 63. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 56, at 64,696–97 (discussing a 2005 regulation of 
mercury emissions from power plants, Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606, 28,620 (May 18, 2005) (Final 
Rule) (the “Mercury Rule”), and EPA’s view at the time that it should set emissions levels based 
on a “combination of the cap-and-trade mechanism and the technology needed”). In response to 
a challenge to the CPP filed in the D.C. Circuit, briefs further referenced industry support for 
trading-based regulation under section 111(d). See Respondent EPA’s Final Brief at 12, 30–34, 
West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2016) (noting that the CPP is “based on an 
analysis of what power plants are already doing,” explaining that state regulatory programs, 
industry actors, and other CAA programs already rely on “generation-shifting,” and citing past 
industry support for the “Mercury Rule,” which promoted a “cap-and-trade” scheme similar to 
that utilized by the CPP).  
 64. EPA, BASIS FOR DENIAL OF PETITIONS TO RECONSIDER AND PETITIONS TO STAY THE 
CAA SECTION 111(D) EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
COMPLIANCE TIMES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS 1 (2017) [hereinafter “EPA, 
BASIS FOR DENIAL”]. 
 65. See id. at 22 (“[T]rends toward low- and zero-emitting energy, upon which the CPP 
builds, continue unabated . . . .”). 
 66. Id. 
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Under new leadership following the election of President Trump, 
EPA proffered a different read of the statute, focusing on claims of 
hardships imposed on the regulated industry.67 EPA claimed 
consistency with an earlier EPA “inside the fenceline” approach to 
sources regulated under Section 111(d).68 Based on EPA’s new view of 
the Clean Air Act’s “text, context, structure, purpose, and legislative 
history, as well as with the Agency’s historical understanding and 
exercise of its statutory authority,” EPA said (in its proposed repeal) 
that the “CPP exceed[ed] the EPA’s statutory authority” and was “not 
within the bounds of our statutory authority.”69 EPA initially proposed 
a complete repeal of the CPP, but without committing to any 
 
 67. EPA actually just alluded to claims of such hardships and costs, neither providing citation 
to record evidence or particular comments from the rulemaking process nor stating its own 
conclusion about such claims. See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,038 (Oct. 16, 2017) 
(Proposed Rule) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (stating that “numerous states, regulated 
entities and other stakeholders warned that the CPP threatened to impose massive costs on the 
power sector and consumers”). It also did not address contradictions between these alleged 
hardships and contrary conclusions in the agency’s 2017 reconsideration-petition denial. See EPA, 
BASIS FOR DENIAL, supra note 64 (noting accelerating clean-energy trends and lower-than-
anticipated associated costs).  
 68. See CPP Repeal Proposal supra note 2, at 48,037 (“[T]he EPA . . . is proposing to 
interpret the phrase ‘best system of emission reduction’ in a way that is consistent with the 
Agency’s historical practice of determining a BESR by considering only measures that can be 
applied to or at the source.”). Whether this claim about EPA’s “historical practice” is accurate 
has been disputed due to past proposals about how to regulate power plants, past section 111(d) 
regulation, and other trading-based regulatory actions. See Comments of the Natural Resources 
Defense Council on EPA’s Proposed Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 8–10 (Apr. 26, 2018) (documenting 
past actions contradicting EPA’s “historical practice” claim). 
 69. See CPP Repeal Proposal supra note 2, at 48,036, 48,038. In later discussion, EPA 
discussed its new authority as based on the “best construction” of the statute, indicating that it 
perhaps had not fully surrendered its past authority. Id. at 48,039–43. Nonetheless, it repeatedly 
asserts that the CPP “exceed[ed]” EPA’s authority to regulate, justifying this view by relying on 
textual interpretations of section 111, review of its legislative history, analysis of prior rulemaking 
practice under that section, broader statutory context, and claimed “serious” economic impacts 
of the CPP approach. See id. at 48,039–43. In 2017, the agency viewed the statute as mandating an 
“inside-the-fenceline” approach, stating its regulation “must be something that physically or 
operationally changes the source itself, and that is taken at or applied to individual, particular 
sources.” Id. at 48,043. “Generation shifting,” as earlier embraced in the CPP, was described as 
“fail[ing] to comply with this limitation.” Id. at 48,042. Thus, most statements reveal an 
abnegation rationale that the EPA was prohibited from regulating in the form chosen in the CPP. 
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replacement rule.70 It cited a few consistency-doctrine precedents and 
sought to limit public comment.71  
In offering this new, power-limiting read of the statute, EPA did 
not cite other relevant statutory language previously viewed as key to 
EPA’s power, past cases relied upon, or past rulemakings EPA had 
analyzed in 2015.72 It also ignored EPA’s detailed 2014, 2015, and 2017 
 
 70. CPP Repeal Proposal, supra note 2 (“The EPA has not determined the scope of any 
potential rule under CAA section 111(d) to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 
existing EGUs, and, if it will issue such a rule, when it will do so and what form that rule will 
take.”). 
 71. Id. (“[T]he EPA is not soliciting comments on such information [regarding a possible 
replacement rule] with this proposal.”); id. at 48,039 (citing precedent to support the proposition 
that “the EPA has inherent authority to reconsider, repeal, or revise past decisions to the extent 
permitted by law so long as the Agency provides a reasoned explanation”). 
 72. For example, the Obama administration devoted considerable attention to why it viewed 
its CPP strategies as consistent with past actions. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text 
(reviewing these referenced past actions). Actions by the Trump administration make general 
claims of returning to a prior approach, but they either do not address the particular actions found 
relevant by the Obama administration or provide only a passing reference to those actions. 
Compare Clean Power Plan, supra note 56, at 64,707–25 (Obama EPA action, identifying past 
similarly rationalized regulatory actions and also state-level regulation reducing power-plant 
emissions), with CPP Repeal Proposal, supra note 2, at 48,037, 48,039–41 (Trump EPA action, 
claiming to return to past “historical practice” but not addressing the actions analyzed in the 
Obama-administration analysis, apart from alluding to an action rejected “on other grounds” 
without analyzing the similarities of the action to the CPP); Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline 
Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746, 
44,752 (Aug. 31, 2018) (Proposed Rule) [hereinafter ACE Rule Proposal] (to be codified 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 60) (same). Regarding that action, the “Mercury Rule,” supra note 63, 
Trump’s EPA erroneously claims that the “rule was still ultimately predicated on measures taken 
at the level of individual sources.” Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,041 n.14 (Oct. 16, 
2017) (Proposed Rule) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). The 2005 “Mercury Rule” in fact set a 
pollution cap based on emissions “across the field of units” and proposed to use a cap-and-trade 
strategy. 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,617 (explaining EPA’s use of a “cap-and-trade” program); id. at 28,619 
(explaining setting the cap based on emissions “across the field of units”). Similarly, the Obama 
administration relied substantially on the statutory term “system” as justifying regulation that 
looked beyond technology or on-site pollution-reduction methods. Carbon Pollution Emission 
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 
64,763–78 (Oct. 23, 2015) (Final Rule) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (discussing the statutory 
term “system” and linked language and law to justify setting emissions levels based on more than 
facility-specific measures). The Trump administration leapfrogged past that analysis without 
actually analyzing most of the Obama EPA discussion to focus on earlier actions, even under 
earlier versions of the Clean Air Act and different provisions, and then proffered a new view that 
read “system” and section 111(d) to justify a source- and technology-focused mode of regulation, 
even considering prohibitions on state use of trading and averaging between sources. ACE Rule 
Proposal at 44,751–54, 44,765–68. The agency’s new strategy and statutory view omitted 
engagement with the CPP interpretation being rejected. See also EPA, BASIS FOR DENIAL, supra 
note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the Trump EPA’s 2017 findings about unexpectedly 
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studies of the electricity sector and state regulatory trends and 
accomplishments, and nowhere considered or distinguished its own 
earlier pro-CPP reasoning.73 Further, EPA under Trump leadership 
did not compare or quantify environmental and health costs flowing 
from the repeal proposal. While an accompanying Regulatory Impact 
Statement contained some relevant numbers and comparisons, the 
agency there too shifted its analytical framework.74 Finally, EPA’s 2017 
proposed repeal did not discuss predicted increases in particulate-
matter pollution accompanying GHG emissions or the thousands of 
additional predicted deaths if the CPP were abandoned, yet it was 
under an obligation to consider “costs” and “health” impacts as part of 
its analysis.75 
In 2018, EPA made another regulatory proposal, this time issuing 
a proposed replacement for the CPP, calling it the Affordable Clean 
Energy (“ACE”) rule.76 The ACE proposal also included claims of past 
illegal agency excess in issuing the CPP and claimed that its new “inside 
the fenceline” approach was, in contrast, within its powers.77 In this 
 
rapid shifts to cleaner energy and at lower costs than anticipated in the CPP).  
 73. The Proposed CPP Repeal ignored the 2017 EPA action, where it denied requests to 
withdraw the CPP. In that action, EPA found that between 2015 and 2017, clean-energy trends 
accelerated more than anticipated and with lower costs than predicted in 2015 in the CPP. See 
EPA, BASIS FOR DENIAL, supra note 64, at 22 (noting that data published since the issuance of 
the CPP “demonstrate[s] that the trends toward low- and zero-emitting energy . . . continue 
unabated, and, in fact, have accelerated” and that “this information demonstrates that the state 
emission targets required by the CPP can be achieved with significantly less impact on the 
generation mix in the industry, and at much lower cost, than the EPA projected”). 
 74. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER 
PLAN: PROPOSAL (2017).  
 75. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012) (including within the definition of “standard of 
performance” a requirement that the EPA Administrator “tak[e] into account the cost of 
achieving [emission] reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact”). The 
CPP discussed such avoided deaths. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 56, at 64,914. The repeal 
proposal does not do so, despite section 111(a)’s mandate.  
 76. ACE Rule Proposal, supra note 72, at 44,748. 
 77. See id. (relying on legal analysis presented in EPA’s October 2017 proposed repeal of 
the CPP, which asserted that the CPP’s “Best System of Emission Reduction” exceeded EPA’s 
authority because it “us[ed] measures that applied to the power sector as a whole, rather than 
measures that apply at and to, and can be carried out at the level of, individual facilities,” and 
stating that the current rule “aligns with EPA’s statutory authority and obligation” because it 
“evaluat[es] technologies or systems of emission reduction that are applicable to, at, and on the 
premises of the facility for an affected source”). This new proposal, issued under new agency 
leadership after the first administrator resigned following a wave of allegations of irregularities, 
provided more engagement with underlying facts. See Barbash & Paul, supra note 43 (discussing 
the unprecedented string of Trump-administration regulatory losses in the courts; flawed work by 
Trump’s first EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt; the lack of knowledgeable officials surrounding 
political appointees; and views that EPA actions had improved under the leadership of Andrew 
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action, it further reduced its claim of power, stating that it would no 
longer set permissible levels of pollution but instead would provide 
information and leave to the states the setting of emission levels on a 
plant-by-plant basis.78 It is not clear if EPA viewed this second policy 
change as legally required or as another option under the statute.79 
In an unusual form of statutory abnegation, EPA also proposed in 
several different actions to abandon the Clean Water Rule, a 2015 EPA 
and Army Corps of Engineers rule that sought to reduce regulatory 
uncertainty about what sorts of waters are subject to federal 
jurisdiction as “waters of the United States.”80 The 2015 rule followed 
a lengthy rulemaking, preparation of a metastudy of all peer-reviewed 
scientific literature concerning types of waters and their functions and 
“connectivity,” and then publication of this “Connectivity Report” 
after opportunities for comment.81 The Clean Water Rule and 
Connectivity Report both followed three Supreme Court decisions that 
collectively raised many questions about the reach of federal power.82 
 
Wheeler); Lisa Friedman, Trump Says He’ll Nominate Andrew Wheeler to Head the EPA, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/climate/trump-andrew-wheeler-
epa.html [https://perma.cc/KA84-BPKA] (discussing Wheeler and allegations of improprieties by 
Pruitt).  
 78. See ACE Rule Proposal, supra note 72, at 44,748 (“EPA’s primary role in implementing 
CAA section 111(d) is to provide emission guidelines that inform the development, submittal, 
and implementation of state plans, and to subsequently determine whether submitted state plans 
are approvable.”); id. at 44,750 (“[U]nder EPA’s new proposed regulations implementing CAA 
section 111(d), which tracks with the existing implementing regulations in this regard, the 
guideline document serves to ‘provide information for the development of state plans.’”); id. at 
44,772–73 (discussing changed agency construction of “emission standard” and “standard of 
performance”).  
 79. The ACE Rule Proposal discussion only elliptically acknowledges the policy change and 
does not engage with EPA’s CPP discussion of its legal authority to set pollution caps that, in 
turn, states, regions, and polluters would need to achieve.  
 80. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (Final Rule) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 81. EPA, EPA/600/R-14/675F, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO 
DOWNSTREAM WATERS: A REVIEW & SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ES-1 (2015). 
 82. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054. 
The cases causing confusion about the scope of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) were: United States 
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), which observed a broad definition of 
navigable waters, based upon the broad integrity goals of the CWA; Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), which rejected a 
claim of federal jurisdiction under the CWA over wholly intrastate, isolated waters such as ponds, 
gravel pits, and seasonal waters due to their use as migratory-bird habitats; and Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), which caused legal uncertainties due to a plurality opinion by Justice 
Scalia, which held the CWA to protect only a small category of waters; a swing concurrence by 
Justice Kennedy, which more expansively protected waters based on their functions; and 
dissenters who concluded that “waters of the United States” encompassed all wetlands and 
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The 2017 and 2018 abnegation claims—and their associated 
deregulatory actions regarding the Clean Water Rule and federally 
protected “water[s] of the United States”—were unusual and a bit 
indirect. EPA, following instructions from President Trump in an 
executive memorandum,83 proposed in several actions to adopt a legal 
interpretation of the reach of federal power based on a plurality 
opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia in the Rapanos84 case.85 That opinion, 
however, not only failed to garner a Court majority, it also ran counter 
to views of five Justices—based on the dissent and Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence—about the sorts of waters that are protected and legal 
rationales for their protection.86 The Scalia opinion’s narrow view of 
federal power as limited to permanently flowing and continuously 
connected waters also would have substantially cut back on the 
coverage of the Clean Water Act. And the opinion’s test for 
jurisdiction was rooted in dictionary-based parsing of the statute and 
would have eliminated from federal jurisdiction most of the waters in 
America’s West and Southwest—arguably, the very areas most in need 
of protection.87 In those regions, arid conditions prevail and pollutants 
 
tributaries that satisfied either Scalia’s or Kennedy’s standard due to five Justices supporting 
protection of these waters. Id. at 792–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Clean Water Rule: Definition 
of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,060–61 (discussing Court splits and resulting 
law). For analysis of the Clean Water Rule and its durability, see generally Patrick Parenteau, 
The Clean Water Rule: Not Dead Yet, 48 ENVTL. L. 377 (2018). 
 83. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017). The Order is titled 
“Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the ‘Waters of the 
United States’ Rule.” Id. at 12,497.  
 84. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 85. Intention to Review and Rescind or Revise the Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,532, 
12, 532 (Mar. 6, 2017) (Notice of Intent). 
 86. Justice Kennedy and the four dissenters largely agreed with one another’s rationales for 
protecting waters and the types of waters that would be protected, but the dissenters would have 
gone further and also deferred more to regulators’ approaches. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 767–78 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the dissenters’ view that impermanent 
streams are covered by the CWA); id. at 778–83 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(disagreeing with the breadth of the dissent’s interpretation of navigable waters and opining that 
a “significant nexus” must exist between the bodies of water in question and “traditional” 
navigable waters in order to bring those bodies under the jurisdiction of the CWA); id. at 807–10 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that, despite disagreement with Justice Kennedy’s “significant 
nexus” formulation, this test will “probably not do much to diminish the number of wetlands 
covered by the Act in the long run,” and stating that waters hence should be protected if “either 
the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied”). 
 87. Id. at 730–37 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (arguing that commonsense dictionary 
definitions, in addition to judicial precedent and the CWA’s own structure, call for limiting the 
CWA’s jurisdiction over “navigable waters,” statutorily defined as “waters of the United States,” 
only to “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water”). 
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can concentrate or be disposed of in dry riverbeds that become crucial 
waterbodies (or vehicles to carry toxins) during rare but heavy rains. 
EPA’s proposed adoption of this view would involve abnegation 
at several levels: it would reject how a majority of Justices in Rapanos 
construed the nature and extent of federal power; it would reject 
decades of contrary regulatory interpretations by EPA and the Army 
Corps; it would run contrary to the Connectivity Report’s conclusions; 
and it would disavow authority to protect waters in much of the nation, 
even where quality water is most important. The first three 2017 and 
2018 actions seeking to roll back the scope of protected waters, 
however, did not mention the Connectivity Report, nor did the agency 
analyze the impact of such a redefinition of protected waters.88 
A supplemental notice issued in 2018 offered more by way of 
justification and legal analysis, but it still vaguely claimed the illegality 
of prior authority and skirted engagement with much of the Clean 
Water Rule’s reasoning and science-based justification.89 A late 2018 
proposal started a new notice-and-comment process to create a new 
definition of federally protected “waters.”90 It mentioned the 
Connectivity Report and discussed underlying cases. However, 
although it proposed major policy changes and adopted a legal view 
contrary to the legal views that EPA, the Army Corps, and the 
 
 88. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5,200, 5,202–03 (Feb. 6, 2018) (Final Rule) (emphasizing a 
lack of associated costs and benefits due to claimed maintenance of the legal status quo of the 
Clean Water Rule, which was finalized but not yet in effect due to judicial stays); Definition of 
“Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 82 
Fed. Reg. 55,542, 55,544–45 (Nov. 22, 2017) (Proposed Rule) (proposing an applicability date and 
reiterating that agencies were not soliciting comment on the scope of the definition of “waters of 
the United States” “[b]ecause the agencies propose to simply add the applicability date and 
ensure continuance of the legal status quo and because it is a temporary, interim measure pending 
substantive rulemaking”); Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-
Existing Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,899, 34,903 (July 27, 2017) (Proposed Rule) (stating that agencies 
were not seeking comment on pre-2015 rules or the “scope of the definition of ‘waters of the 
United States’” until the second step of the two-step process).  
 89. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 
Fed. Reg. 32,227, 32,238 (July 12, 2018) (Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (in a 
substantially expanded justification for the policy shift, stating that, as “a result of the agencies’ 
review and reconsideration of their statutory authority and in light of the court rulings against the 
2015 Rule[,] . . . the agencies are . . . concerned that the 2015 Rule lacks sufficient statutory 
basis”). In places, this notice softens the abnegation claim, stating that the earlier rule “may” have 
exceeded the agencies’ authority. Id. at 32,240; id. at 32,247 (noting that some commenters have 
opined that the rule “may not effectively reflect the specific policy” of Congress regarding the 
balance of federal and state authority under the Clean Water Act). 
 90. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4,154 (Feb. 14, 2019) 
(Proposed Rule) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).  
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Department of Justice embraced for a decade after Rapanos, the 
proposal did not admit this major change or provide comparative 
analysis of the change’s effects.91 Its language again appears to embrace 
the view that it was required to utilize the Scalia approach,92 declined 
the Kennedy approach and (erroneously) labeled it as the view of a 
“single [J]ustice,”93 and declined to base the new definition on science 
as set forth in the Connectivity Report. In fact, it asserted a new view 
that “science cannot be used to draw the line between Federal and 
State waters, as those are legal distinctions . . . .”94 This latest action 
hence appears to view its abnegating, shrunken view of federal power 
as legally mandated by the Scalia approach. At the same time, the 
agency rejected most of the “significant nexus” approach set forth by 
Justice Kennedy, despite that approach being substantially embraced 
by a Court majority—Justice Kennedy and the four dissenters from the 
Scalia plurality opinion.95 
In another policy reversal, this time related to the reach of the 
Clean Air Act’s regulation of hazardous air-pollutant emitters, EPA 
disclaimed power it had asserted for twenty-two years. In 1995, EPA 
interpreted the law to require that sources regulated as “major” 
hazardous air-pollutant emitters under Section 112 of the Act 
remained “major” once so classified.96 In 2018, however, a new EPA 
memorandum did not just reverse that view but also claimed that EPA 
had no such power under the Act.97 Despite decades of experience 
 
 91. See id. at 4,155–56. 
 92. Id. at 4,174 (quoting language from the plurality in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 
723 (2006), which used words of limitation such as “only” and “necessary condition” to define 
“waters of the United States”).  
 93. Id. at 4,196 (calling the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy in Rapanos the views of a 
“single justice” and stating concerns that the Clean Water Rule “relies too heavily on 
considerations that Justice Kennedy expresses”). 
 94. Id. at 4,176. 
 95. The dissenters and Justice Kennedy favorably commented on each other’s approaches, 
but the dissenters did not fully join the Kennedy opinion because he called for an expanded 
judicial role in assessing “significant nexus” waters; the dissenters called for more judicial 
deference to regulatory judgments of EPA and the Army Corps. See supra note 86 and 
accompanying text. In their discussion of types of protected waters and rationales, however, the 
opinions had much in common. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (discussing the split 
opinions in Rapanos and the creation of two majority positions regarding protected waters). 
 96. Memorandum from John S. Seitz, Dir., EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and 
Standards, to Reg’l Offices 9 (May 16, 1995) (withdrawn Jan. 25, 2018) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal).  
 97. Memorandum from William L. Wehrum, Assistant Adm’r, EPA to Reg’l Air Div. Dirs. 
3 (Jan. 25, 2018) (calling the previous policy “contrary to the plain language” of the statute 
because the old “once in, always in” policy imposed a “temporal limitation” that Congress never 
BUZBEE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  4:08 PM 
2019] AGENCY STATUTORY ABNEGATION 1533 
under the old policy, the agency did not analyze the track record of the 
longstanding view, its impact on air quality, or the changes that might 
flow from the new statutory read.98 Both policies were stated in 
interpretive documents issued without notice-and-comment process. 
In another deregulatory carveout that quickly garnered attention, 
EPA in late 2017 proposed to reverse its earlier regulation stating that 
upgraded trucks installed with refurbished old diesel engines were 
subject to regulation as “new” motor vehicles under the Clean Air 
Act.99 Such trucks, known as “gliders,” emit more diesel-linked 
pollutants and GHGs than completely new, state-of-the-art trucks with 
new engines and designs, but gliders are far cheaper and, due to their 
use of recycled components, are reported by their manufacturers to 
result in fewer GHG emissions associated with their construction.100 
EPA in 2016 had required gliders to meet new-truck emissions levels, 
basing that judgment on a combination of statutory language, statutory 
goals evident in the law, and assessment of pollution impacts.101 
In 2017, EPA stated its new view that it “lack[ed] authority to 
regulate” any aspect of the glider business—trucks, engines, or kits—
under the Act’s regulation of pollution from “new” motor vehicles.102 
The agency argued that there was no congressional “specific intent” to 
regulate “such a thing as a glider” and offered a somewhat convoluted 
“whole law” analysis of the Act, parsing its amendments, its larger 
context, and the roots of the Act’s definition of “new” as drawn from 
an earlier statute.103 The agency concluded it “is implausible” that a 
“new motor vehicle” would “include a vehicle comprised of new body 
parts and a previously owned powertrain.”104 In a brief fallback, it 
stated that “[a]t a minimum, ambiguity exists” and cited Chevron as an 
 
placed in the CAA). For analysis of this shift, see Michelle West, “Once In, Always In” Now Out: 
How the EPA is Reducing Regulations on Hazardous Air Pollutant Emitters, GEO. ENVTL. L. 
REV. ONLINE (Mar. 3, 2018), https://gelr.org/2018/03/03/once-in-always-in-now-out-how-the-epa-
is-reducing-regulations-on-hazardous-air-pollutant-emitters/ [https://perma.cc/C926-DLSP].  
 98. Memorandum from William L. Wehrum, supra note 97. 
 99. Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits, 
82 Fed. Reg. 53,442 (Nov. 16, 2017) (Proposed Rule) [hereinafter Glider Repeal Proposal] (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1037, 1068).  
 100. Id. 
 101. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty 
Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478 (Oct. 25, 2016) (Final Rule) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 9). 
 102. Glider Repeal Proposal, supra note 99, at 53,443–44.  
 103. Id. at 53,443–46. 
 104. Id. at 53,445–46.  
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additional ground for its policy reversal.105 Although the notice 
includes a brief discussion of the benefits of gliders, the agency does 
not discuss or reveal overall emissions impacts or compare its new view 
with the effects, findings, or reasoning of the earlier position. 
Subsequent news stories and a letter sent by a group of senators to 
EPA’s first Administrator under the Trump administration, Scott 
Pruitt, raised numerous questions about this regulatory reversal’s 
genesis, legality, and underlying factual and technical basis.106 
The United States Department of Labor has similarly utilized an 
abnegation strategy, relying on disclaimers of statutory authority under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act as a justification for a 2017 rollback of a 
finalized regulation designed to ensure that workers retain tips. Earlier 
regulations mandated that “tipped employees retain all of their tips” 
except in typical “tip pool[ing]” settings.107 In late 2017, however, the 
department published a proposed rule that, contrary to the 
department’s earlier rules and litigation defenses that had mixed 
success, now stated it had “serious concerns that it incorrectly 
construed the statute” and had exceeded “the scope” of its power.108 It 
also stated concerns with the regulations “as a policy matter.”109 The 
previous regulatory mandate limiting employer discretion in the 
allocation of tips would, under the proposal, become a matter resolved 
by contract—“a matter of agreement between the employer and 
employees”—or “of state law.”110 It stated that it was “unable to 
quantify” how customers would respond or how “reallocations of tips” 
would affect previously tipped employees.111 Although the earlier 
 
 105. Id. at 53,446. The Glider Repeal Proposal at one point calls its prior reading “not the best 
reading,” language also consistent with this new reading not being a clear answer to the “precise 
question” under Chevron Step One. Id. at 53,445. Generally, however, its several pages of analysis 
support the view that EPA was claiming it had no power to regulate gliders as new.  
 106. Letter from Senators Tom Carper and Tom Udall to Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, EPA (Mar. 12, 
2018) (citing news stories and other studies questioning the genesis of the proposed rule change 
and the integrity of the studies and industry materials relied upon); Eric Lipton, Steering Big Rigs 
Around Emissions Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2018, at A1 (recounting meetings between a 
company that builds gliders and Administrator Pruitt, effects of the rollback, and concerns of low-
polluting-truck manufacturers about the break for gliders). 
 107. Tip Regulations Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 82 Fed. Reg. 57,395, 
57,395 (Dec. 5, 2017) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comments) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 531) (reviewing legislative, regulatory, and litigation history preceding the 2017 
actions, and stating the Department of Labor’s new contrary legal view). 
 108. Id. at 57,399. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 57,396. 
 111. Id. 
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regulation was still in effect and hence binding, the department also 
reiterated an earlier 2017 policy of “nonenforcement” of the 2011 
regulation to employers paying at least the full minimum wage and not 
taking a “tip credit.”112 Subsequent news stories reported that the 
department actually had prepared a quantified analysis of the 
regulatory revision’s impacts that found that billions of dollars would 
be reallocated from tipped workers to employers.113 After internal 
disputes and White House consultation, they “removed the economic 
transfer data altogether.”114 Ultimately, Congress intervened with a 
statutory resolution contained in a massive omnibus spending bill.115 
In late 2017, the Agricultural Marketing Service of the United 
States Department of Agriculture proposed to withdraw a rule that had 
regulated livestock handling, conditions, and care.116 This instance of 
abnegation broadly disclaimed power to regulate animal welfare, 
stating that such regulation was “not authorize[d],” the agency’s power 
was “authoritatively prescribed” by the statute, and that it “lack[ed] 
the power to tailor legislation to policy goals, however worthy, by 
rewriting unambiguous statutory terms.”117 However, the agency 
waffled a bit on the abnegation claim, in one instance calling “market-
based solutions . . . more appropriate.”118 The agency concluded its 
 
 112. Id. at 57,399. 
 113. Ben Penn, Labor Dept. Ditches Data Showing Bosses Could Skim Waiters’ Tips, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-
report/labor-dept-ditches-data-showing-bosses-could-skim-waiters-tips [https://perma.cc/U99L-
WFNM]; see also text accompanying infra note 115 (citing other news stories discussing this 
history). 
 114. Penn, supra note 113. 
 115. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. § 1201 (2018) (in an 
appropriations rider, resolving the controversy by prohibiting employers from keeping 
employees’ tips); see Noam Scheiber, Trump Administration Retreats on Tip-Sharing Plan in 
Compromise, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/business/
economy/tipping-workers.html [https://perma.cc/ML86-CCQN] (reporting on the legislative 
resolution); Lydia Wheeler, Spending Bill Prevents Employers from Pocketing Tips Under Tip-
Pooling Rule, HILL (Mar. 21, 2018, 8:57 PM EDT), https://thehill.com/regulation/379662-
spending-bill-prevents-employers-from-pocketing-tips-under-tip-pooling-rule [https://perma.cc/
X4GX-JZNB] (reporting that Democratic Senator Patty Murray reached a deal with Trump 
Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta to add a spending-bill rider amending the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to prevent employers, managers, or supervisors from pocketing workers’ tips 
regardless of whether they earn gratuities on top of a full minimum wage). 
 116. National Organic Program (NOP); Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices—
Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 59,988 (Dec. 18, 2017) (Proposed Rule) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 
205). 
 117. Id. at 59,989. 
 118. Id. at 59,959 n.5. 
BUZBEE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  4:08 PM 
1536  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1509 
legal analysis with a fallback claim that its new interpretation should, 
if the lack-of-power reasoning were rejected, be viewed as “a 
permissible statutory construction.”119 As with several other 
abnegation-based deregulatory actions, the agency did not discuss how 
or whether animal welfare would change as a result, how consumers 
might respond, or how producers might be affected, focusing instead 
on consumer growth in organic markets and risks of “overly 
prescriptive regulation.”120 
In 2017, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), an 
independent agency, took substantial steps toward abandoning the 
“net neutrality” regulation promulgated in 2015.121 This proposal and 
the later tentative final order relied on a weaker form of statutory 
abnegation. The agency did not wholly disclaim power but instead 
stated the earlier action was founded on unsound “statutory 
construction” and claimed the new action was based on a “better 
reading” of the statute.122 This new interpretation resulted in a 
substantially reduced regulatory role for the FCC and left major 
internet actors subject to reduced regulatory oversight. 
Under a slightly different form of statutory abnegation, an agency 
does not decisively disavow power but rather identifies ambiguity 
about agency authority and then rationalizes a power retreat as wise in 
light of such doubt. The Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) in 
2017 and 2018 sought to abandon a 2016 rule governing methane 
pollution linked to oil and gas extraction and related royalties.123 BLM 
explained the reversal as partly due to the argument—originally made 
 
 119. Id. at 59,990. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568 (June 2, 2017) (Proposed Rule) (to be 
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 8, 20). The FCC revealed its likely policy-change choice and rationale 
with a Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, but that document does not preclude further 
comment and FCC adjustment. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (1) (2017) 
[hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom Ruling].  
 122. Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. at 25,575. 
 123. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 7924 (Feb. 22, 2018) (Proposed 
Rule) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3,160, 3,170) [hereinafter “BLM Waste Rule Rescission 
Proposal”]; Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Delay and Suspension of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,050 (Dec. 8, 2017) (Final Rule) 
[hereinafter “BLM Waste Suspension Rule”]. A district court declared that the BLM Waste 
Suspension Rule illegally circumvented numerous requirements of consistency doctrine, was 
“untethered to evidence,” failed to allow meaningful opportunity for comments, and contained 
internal logical inconsistencies. California v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1065–
66, 1071–72 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
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by industry challenging the rule but largely embraced by BLM in 2017 
and 2018—that the 2016 rule “exceeded the BLM’s statutory 
authority.”124 The agency stated that its earlier focus on “conservation 
without regard to economic feasibility” was illegal, as was its 
consideration of “environmental and societal benefits rather than . . . 
resource conservation benefits alone.” Further, BLM claimed that it 
had illegally engaged in pollution regulation delegated to EPA and the 
states under other laws.125 After offering these statutory-abnegation 
justifications for deregulating, BLM also pointed to alleged procedural 
infirmities with the prior regulations and the risk of their rejection 
under the APA.126 But the agency also explained its new deregulatory 
move as a better choice, especially where no governing statute 
mandated the 2016 regulation.127 In September of 2018, BLM issued a 
final rule that more firmly relied on statutory-abnegation rationales, 
again identifying several ways it claimed BLM had exceeded its 
authority in 2016, including among them claims that it had previously 
been excessively stringent.128 This last, far more limited form of 
abnegation—a claim of illegality due to excessively ambitious 
regulation and resulting hardship—involves something more akin to 
doubts about the rigor of a particular choice as a rationale for a 
regulatory change or reversal and, as a result, leads to less aggressive 
agency assertion of power over those regulated. 
B. Statutory-Abnegation Variants and Differences 
In these instances of statutory abnegation, several common 
elements are apparent. This section briefly identifies these elements. 
1. Deregulatory Benefits.  All are deregulatory actions or, in one 
instance, an initial declination to act that followed an earlier contrary 
 
 124. BLM Waste Rule Rescission Proposal, supra note 123, at 7927–28. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 7927. 
 127. Id. at 7927–28.  
 128. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 49,184 at 49,185–86, 49,189–90 
(Sept. 28, 2018) (Final Rule) [hereinafter “BLM Waste Rule Rescission Final”] (alleging that 
BLM’s prior statutory interpretation was illegal, and adopting a more limited read of its powers 
that it characterized as consistent with “longstanding” approaches and as avoiding conflict with 
the Clean Air Act). BLM’s hybrid claim of illegal power that is linked to excess stringency states 
that “by failing to give due regard to operator economics, the BLM exceeded its statutory 
authority.” Id. at 48,189. 
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statement about the agency’s power.129 Through statutory abnegation, 
the agency reduces burdens imposed on regulated entities. All such 
actions, other than the series of choices leading to Massachusetts v. 
EPA, prominently tout their antiregulatory rationales, sometimes 
including extensive language about the harms of regulation and agency 
power. Such actions can involve a claim of no power to regulate in an 
area at all, but they sometimes constitute a more action-specific 
disavowal that the agency lacked power to regulate as it did. Sometimes 
the assertion is written as though it is about a statutory line or mandate 
prohibiting action but, in a broader context, seems to be nothing more 
than a claim that the agency went too far under the facts or science. 
2. Omitted Comparative Analysis of Legal Reasoning and Effects.  
Recent uses of statutory abnegation are also notable in what they 
decline to do or include. All involve the new statutory interpretation 
disclaiming power but make only passing reference to the previous 
contrary statutory views and the rationales that had explained them. 
Most fail to provide an old–new comparison of effects of the 
interpretive change, and most also place little or no weight on studies, 
science, and facts previously discussed in regulating under the earlier 
statutory interpretation. The new view’s benefits are discussed, at least 
in broad terms, but the old approach’s benefits that would now be 
foregone, and hence logically tallied as costs of the new regulatory 
choice, receive little attention. Agencies’ also have not discussed the 
track record under the earlier approach, actions in reliance on the 
earlier policy, or other intervening changes. 
These abnegation actions hence seem to reflect at least an implicit 
view that the more the agency argues that it lacks power through 
statutory abnegation, the less it needs to engage with other factors, 
such as the basis for the earlier (but now abandoned) view of the 
agency’s power or the underlying facts, data, or scientific contingencies 
relevant to the old and new action. 
3. A Textualist Narrative and Word-Driven Choice.  To the extent 
lengthy, small-type Federal Register documents can reveal a narrative, 
the story told by abnegating agencies tends to be that the agency had 
overreached, that it now respects the law’s limits, and that regulation 
is often bad and economic activity will be enhanced by the deregulatory 
 
 129. The latter setting describes the agency history leading to Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007). See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text. 
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action. Several seem to parrot language, rationales, and methods that 
microtextualist judges, such as the late Justice Antonin Scalia, would 
utilize in interpreting statutes.130 Also consistent with some forms of 
textualist methodology, these agencies devote little attention to the 
impacts of their new interpretive choice, perhaps because it is 
presented as obligatory and hence not a choice at all. All mention 
compliance with executive orders calling for deregulation and reduced 
regulatory costs. Even these narratives, however, often contain little 
supporting documentation, sometimes citing no authority and at other 
times only alluding generally to burdens that would have allegedly 
resulted under the earlier policy, but without indicating the sources for 
such claims.131 The agencies in most of these actions do not actually 
scrutinize this information about regulatory effects or claimed 
hardships, or offer the agency’s own conclusions, but they nonetheless 
propose a broad regulatory rollback. A few late 2018 actions, however, 
included a bit more attention to before-and-after comparisons of 
regulatory effects.132 
 
 130. Textualism comes in numerous forms, with Justice Scalia favoring a form that tended to 
focus upon a snippet of language, often with little attention to immediately surrounding language, 
larger structure, or statutory indications of policy goals, even when stated in the text. For an in-
depth critique, see VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 103–34 
(2016), reviewing Scalia’s form of textualism as “petty textualism.” As a shorthand, I refer to such 
a narrow focus as “microtextualism.” In a less developed strain of cases, Justices mostly utilizing 
a textualist methodology have expanded their focus, generally en route to rejecting an agency’s 
new claim of authority. See infra notes 141–46 (discussing these cases); see also Buzbee, The 
Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1373–75 (discussing the “major questions” canon and its 
implications for deregulatory policy changes). In a growing line of Supreme Court opinions 
exhibiting a more integrative and functional mode of statutory analysis, Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Kagan, in opinions speaking for the Court, analyze statutory texts with attention to all 
statutory signals but generally maintain a focus on the text itself; they simply do not focus as 
narrowly as Justice Scalia did in some of his most famous “new textualism” decisions. Id. at 1365–
67. Justice Kagan employed this form of textualism in a recent case addressing the National Park 
Service’s jurisdiction over hovercraft use on an Alaskan river. See generally Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 
S. Ct. 1066 (2019) (reviewing operative text, surrounding language, definitions, other regulatory 
powers in parks outside Alaska, other legislation regulating the same area, the history of the 
legislation and compromises, legislative history, and the consequences of alternative 
interpretations, concluding that the agency lacked power to regulate). 
 131. See, e.g., CPP Repeal Proposal, supra note 2, at 48,038, 48,042 (referring to costs, harms, 
and energy-system risks under the CPP, but without attribution or stating the agency’s 
conclusions about such claims and not discussing the change from a virtually opposite agency 
position in CPP documentation or the 2017 EPA, BASIS FOR DENIAL, supra note 64). 
 132. See, e.g., ACE Rule Proposal, supra note 72 and accompanying text; supra note 92 and 
accompanying text. 
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4. Initial Declinations to Act, Distinguished.  Another category of 
abnegation likely exists but is hard to identify and raises a different set 
of issues; it hence is excluded here, apart from this limited 
identification. Agencies frequently need to make decisions based on 
facts and law about whether they should, for the first time, assert 
jurisdiction over or impose regulations on a source of risk. They may 
decline to do so out of concern about a lack of statutory authority, or 
perhaps concern about challenges to their authority, or any number of 
other reasons usually linked to agency choices in a world of many 
options, demands, and limited resources. But without the wrinkle of 
policy change, the agency generally has no reason or need to explain a 
choice not to act. The Supreme Court in State Farm133 saw this 
distinction as important, rejecting the government’s attempt to justify 
a policy reversal as so much like an agency choice not to act as to 
deserve similarly minimal or nonexistent judicial scrutiny.134 
But as the State Farm Court noted, the two are different. With an 
initial choice not to act, there is unlikely to be a body of fact-finding 
related to, or scientific study tailored to, the regulatory action 
ultimately declined. As a result, there may be no written documents 
declaring or explaining an abnegation rationale or whether a different 
view is tenable. In fact, such action is often no action at all. In addition, 
there are no regulatory track records, ripple effects, or subsequent 
reliance interests associated with initial choices not to act. Abnegation 
would deliver no new regulatory relief, and hence there is little 
opportunity for agency credit claiming. Furthermore, such an initial 
choice not to claim power or act triggers a substantially different body 
of doctrine, much linked to the “committed to agency discretion” 
exclusion from judicial review under the APA.135 This body of law 
grants agencies broad, and possibly unreviewable, discretion in how 
they choose to deploy limited resources and choose among an array of 
possible actions. This Article therefore generally puts to the side 
possible abnegation rationales for agencies continuing to take no 
action. 
 
 133. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, (1983). 
 134. Id. at 41–43. 
 135. See generally Ronald Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 
MINN. L. REV. 689, 702–34 (1990) (discussing unreviewability doctrines). 
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5. Chevron Policy Change, Distinguished.  Although the principles 
of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.136 
might seem to support statutory abnegation, that case did not involve 
abnegation at all.137 Where an agency decides to adjust the stringency 
of its regulation or identify new permissible means for compliance with 
a legal edict (be it statutory or regulatory) but does not disclaim its 
power, there is no abnegation. Instead, the agency is basically 
embracing what it will claim is a better regulatory means as a matter of 
policy choice. In fact, an agency identifying a new means for 
compliance will often be claiming an expanded range of power in the 
sense that the agency is claiming statutory authority to regulate in 
several different ways. That the action may result in some sort of 
regulatory relief, perhaps in the form of reduced compliance costs, 
does not make it a form of abnegation. The agency is not denying that 
it has legal authority, even though it may be revising policy and 
reducing regulatory burdens. 
6. Changed Regulatory Stringency, Distinguished.  Another 
common sort of action often characterized as deregulatory is neither 
an example of statutory abnegation nor even an example of policy 
change. Nonetheless, by way of contrast, brief analysis will help explain 
why statutory abnegation is different. Agencies frequently are 
obligated by statutes to assess some underlying science or social 
conditions and, depending on their factual findings, adjust regulatory 
obligations. So, for example, agencies will assess air quality and, as a 
result, change a jurisdiction’s legal category.138 Regulation might also 
hinge in part on assessments of cutting-edge technological 
capabilities.139 Or, agencies may examine a product’s risk and adjust its 
labeling, licensing, or marketing scheme.140 Although such actions can 
make a massive difference in resulting regulatory obligations—
 
 136. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7410 (2012) (setting forth interrelated provisions creating an 
“ambient air quality standard” scheme, state obligations, and linked classifications of their status). 
 139. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012) (setting forth a program regulating emitters of hazardous air 
polluters and requiring achievement of various benchmarked forms of “best” achievable 
performance). 
 140. See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (describing such regulation in a 
challenge to claimed preemptive impacts of regulatory action); David A. Kessler & David C. 
Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 
GEO. L.J. 461 (2008) (reviewing FDA roles and food and drug laws’ interplay with common-law 
regimes).  
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potentially adding burdens or easing requirements—they do not 
necessarily involve any changed view of the agency’s statutory 
authority or any policy change. Static legal criteria simply can lead to 
changing regulatory obligations in light of new science, data, and 
conditions. This is a common source of changed regulatory obligations. 
Hence, so-called regulatory rollbacks can sometimes involve neither 
abnegation nor policy change at all. 
7. Past Abnegation, Effects on Future Regulatory Action, and the 
“Major Questions” Canon.  Actions that involve past abnegation, in 
the sense of previously disclaimed power and then a new assertion of 
authority, are also worth noting. Agencies will, at times, quite explicitly 
seek to regulate a source of risk that had earlier been unregulated, 
sometimes due to earlier agency disavowals of authority to regulate. A 
paradigmatic and often cited example is discussed in the Brown & 
Williamson decision.141 FDA had previously declined to regulate 
tobacco products, and Congress had enacted a number of laws 
specifically authorizing particular types of regulation of tobacco 
products.142 When FDA reexamined its authority in light of new 
revelations of industry practices regarding tobacco products’ design 
and effects and, as a result, newly claimed power to regulate tobacco 
marketing, that earlier abnegation—called “disavowal” in the case—
was significant to the Supreme Court’s subsequent rejection of FDA’s 
power.143 In addition, a difference among the Justices concerned 
whether FDA’s earlier declinations to act had been factually 
contingent—a “contingent disavowal”—or a complete abnegation.144 
Such circumstances involve a new claim of power that was either 
never asserted or was the subject of earlier abnegation. These changing 
claims about agency power have at times triggered the growing body 
of doctrine known as the “power canon” or “major questions” canon, 
under which the Supreme Court has declined to show the usual 
deference to agencies, reviewing the new claim of power skeptically.145 
 
 141. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 142. Id. at 126–30, 143–59 (reviewing FDA’s 1995 and 1996 tobacco actions, as well as other 
congressional actions regarding tobacco and the sequence of FDA actions and officials’ 
statements about FDA’s power to regulate tobacco). 
 143. Id. at 144–59.  
 144. Id. at 186–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reviewing reasons the agency’s past views were fact-
based and could change). 
 145. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1933 (2017) 
(analyzing and criticizing the “major questions” cases, labeled the “power canons,” for how they 
reorder the relationships of the three branches and have an antiregulatory bias).  
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In this converse setting involving past abnegation preceding the new 
power claim, the Court’s more rigorous form of judicial review is quite 
overtly antiregulatory in its rationale and effects. The fact of past 
abnegation and, it appears, sometimes simple past declinations to act, 
can together be part of the rationale for later skeptical and 
undeferential judicial scrutiny. As a result, current abnegation might, 
in effect, set up—perhaps by design—later judicial resistance to a new 
assertion of agency power.146 This may partly explain why agencies 
utilize abnegation as a rationale for deregulation despite the 
disadvantages of doing so. This Article turns now to analyzing this 
doctrinal disadvantage, exploring why we nonetheless see such 
frequent reliance on abnegation, and assessing statutory abnegation as 
a normative matter. 
II.  THE DOCTRINAL ANSWER TO STATUTORY ABNEGATION 
Given the prevalence of statutory abnegation to justify 
deregulatory actions, especially during 2017 and 2018, one might 
expect a strong doctrinal foundation for such a move. However, as is 
apparent when assessed by reviewing courts in light of governing law, 
the bare statutory-abnegation claims rolled out during the Trump 
administration lack doctrinal support.147 This is not to claim that an 
agency could not, at times, correctly identify a power limitation it 
previously disregarded. The point here is that, as utilized and explained 
in most of the agency actions reviewed above, the skimpy reasoning 
and minimal factual engagement accompanying abnegation claims 
appears to be in outright violation of several strains of law governing 
judicial review of agency action, especially regarding policy change. 
Unless several longstanding, foundational judicial-review frameworks 
are substantially revised, abnegation strategies that lack 
accompanying, necessary comparative analysis are unlikely to meet 
success in the courts. 
A. Assessing Proffered Justifications for Statutory Abnegation 
Statutory abnegation has been justified by agencies or 
Department of Justice litigators with several rationales. This Part 
explores these and additional possible justifications for such a strategy, 
 
 146. For other explanations for the legally dubious abnegation strategy, including the related 
long-shot goal of securing judicial ratification of abnegation, see infra Part III. 
 147. They are “bare” due to the lack of analysis of other required antecedents for legal policy 
change. Those requirements follow in this section. 
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with a focus on the likelihood of success upon eventual judicial review. 
It then broadens the perspective, considering incentives and victories 
that might be more political and motivated by a desire to deliver quick 
relief for regulatory targets, even if eventually rejected in the courts. 
1. Presidential Edicts and Direction.  Most agencies utilizing 
statutory abnegation explain their regulatory reconsideration as, at 
least in part, an act of compliance with a president’s deregulatory 
agenda. This was true with the Bush administration’s declinations to 
act regarding climate change,148 and more recently in agency responses 
to President Trump’s priorities, especially as set forth in his Executive 
Order 13,771.149 That order requires all agencies and departments to 
eliminate two regulations for each new regulation and also ensure 
regulatory actions do not result in any new net regulatory costs.150 
Presidents expect all agencies to comply with executive orders. Hence, 
agency reference to governing executive orders is nothing out of the 
ordinary. 
Nonetheless, executive orders, both by their terms and due to 
constitutional structure, cannot justify violations of what is required by 
the Constitution or by enabling legislation governing an agency’s 
actions. Statutes and the Constitution are hierarchically above such 
orders, creating binding law. In addition, an order falls before extant 
promulgated regulations; until revised through another rulemaking 
process, they remain binding law, as long established by United States 
ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy.151 Order 13,771, like past orders, 
explicitly states it is subject to other governing statutory and legal 
requirements.152 Such presidential direction hence can explain an 
agency’s consideration or proposal of deregulatory moves, and perhaps 
has been viewed as something that will provide additional support 
upon judicial review due to a president’s political accountability. An 
executive order would not, however, excuse violations of law, a lack of 
factual support, or actions that in some other respect are arbitrary and 
capricious. No case or law gives a president’s imprimatur via an 
executive order some special authority or power to save an agency 
action that otherwise lacks adequate justification or preceding 
 
 148. See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text. 
 149. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339, 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
 150. Id. 
 151. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265–68 (1954). 
 152. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed., Reg. at 9,340. 
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process.153 If anything, recent cases perhaps are stronger in their 
rejection of agency actions that appear to be little more than agency 
capitulation to a president’s edict; courts instead look for agencies to 
observe all process required by the APA, enabling acts, and “reasoned 
decisionmaking” precedents, including basic tenets of “hard look 
review” and the consistency-doctrine cases reviewed below.154  
2. Change and Chevron.  As mentioned above, some abnegating 
agencies cite Chevron as giving agencies latitude to revamp their 
regulatory approaches, sometimes linking that discussion to President 
Trump’s avowed goal to reduce regulatory burdens.155 The case is also 
sometimes cited as a fallback argument that, if the new statutory 
interpretation fails, the agency’s new interpretation should be upheld 
as at least a reasonable or a permissible choice.156 Chevron certainly is 
a critical endorsement of agency policy reassessment. It provides 
agencies with some additional space to make statutory and policy 
judgments if there is a gap, silence, or ambiguity, with judicial 
deference in such settings required under the Supreme Court’s 
Chevron Two-Step. At Step One of Chevron, an agency and court must 
agree on a statutory interpretation if Congress has addressed the 
“precise question at issue.”157 At Step Two, however, the presence of a 
gap, silence, or ambiguity translates into policymaking discretion to be 
wielded by the agency due to its delegated role and expertise. Courts 
must defer to a “reasonable” or permissible interpretation.158 
 
 153. See David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age 
of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1108–14 (2008) (discussing the role of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) and questions of legitimacy and 
politicization); Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship 
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 327–30, 
365–67 (2014) (discussing and questioning such regulatory-oversight orders’ legality as written 
and applied). 
 154. See infra Part III.D (discussing cases reviewing abnegation-based deregulatory actions). 
 155. EPA frequently cites it in actions, see supra notes 56–106 and accompanying text, but 
other agencies making policy changes also cite it for support. See, e.g., National Organic Program 
(NOP); Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices—Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 59,988, 59,989 (Dec. 
18, 2017) (Proposed Rule) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205) (discussing a Department of 
Agriculture policy reversal referencing Chevron). It appears that agencies making policy changes 
during the Trump administration tend to cite one or more executive orders by way of explanation 
or justification. A Westlaw search of Federal Register notices after 2016 (shortly before President 
Trump was inaugurated) shows over 2500 agency references to such orders.  
 156. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 
(2005) (upholding reasonable interpretation of FCC under Chevron). 
 157. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 158. See id. at 843. 
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But most statutory-abnegation rationales for deregulation involve 
agencies claiming that they could not, in conformity with law, act as 
they previously did. Agency language explaining statutory abnegation 
often seems to describe the agency as acting within, and hence 
constrained by, a Chevron Step One context.159 Because Step One 
requires the agency and court to agree, and with the agency receiving 
no deference, Chevron at Step One provides no additional room or 
judicial deference for the agency’s reinterpretation of the governing 
statutory language.160 So Chevron is one of many cases embracing the 
possibility of policy change, but it actually provides no doctrinal 
mileage for an agency’s claim that it lacks power to act as it did 
previously. If the action genuinely involves a question that can only be 
viewed as implicating Step One, then the agency and reviewing court 
must agree on what the statute requires.161 If there is Step Two “space,” 
then an abnegation claim would be in error because the agency 
disclaiming power would mistakenly be asserting a lack of interpretive 
and policy options.162 An erroneous—and thus illegal—agency claim of 
legal constraint, like any other erroneous statutory interpretation by 
an agency, requires judicial rejection.163 
3. Litigation Risk.  Most agencies pursuing a statutory-abnegation 
strategy focus on their new interpretation, explain it, and in broad 
terms criticize the old view as untenable. Some agencies reject the old 
view in part due to the argument that it is unlikely to receive deference 
from the courts, would be vulnerable upon review, or simply would 
likely lead to litigation that the agency would prefer to avoid.164 This 
 
 159. See id. at 842–45. 
 160. See id. In fact, the general assumption is that agencies view it as advantageous to argue 
that their policy choice, and underlying statutory interpretations, fall within Chevron Step Two 
because it provides an agency room for multiple permissible choices and calls for judicial 
deference. See infra notes 226–30 and accompanying text. 
 161. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45. 
 162. See Hemel and Nielson, supra note 23 (discussing Prill doctrine); Michael Herz, Chevron 
is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1880, 1885–86 (2015) (agreeing with 
Professor Peter Strauss regarding Chevron “space” and Skidmore “weight,” but suggesting a unity 
of deference frames in the focus on ascertaining statutory meaning as part of an analysis of agency 
power). 
 163. In the DACA cases, DHS’s erroneous views about its powers led to a string of judicial 
losses. See supra notes 49–55, and infra notes 335–41 and accompanying text (discussing the 
actions and judicial rejections). 
 164. For a final-rule withdrawal substantially predicated on litigation risks of the earlier 
action, see Scope of Sections 202(a) and (b) of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 
48,594, 48,596–99 (Oct. 18, 2017) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201) (Final Rule) (withdrawing an 
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litigation-risk rationale raises quite different issues and has led to 
different judicial responses.165 
4. Consistency Doctrine’s Constraints.  Some agencies pursue an 
abnegation strategy with supplementary justification.166 They offer a 
more robust legal explanation that acknowledges that, in addition to 
the issues of interpreting the relevant enabling act, agencies proposing 
a policy shift also must provide the analysis required by law governing 
policy change and by consistency doctrine. This is most evident in 
several late 2017 and 2018 actions by EPA.167 In addition to offering an 
abnegating interpretation of the statute, agencies cite and sometimes 
quote from two of the four major modern consistency-doctrine cases. 
Most Trump-administration agencies, however, appear to view citation 
to cases acknowledging the possibility of agency policy change as 
legally sufficient, failing to address the procedural and analytical 
hurdles that consistency doctrine requires agencies to surmount to 
make a successful policy change. This Part now explores these 
requirements of consistency doctrine. 
Agencies referring to this body of law often cite to a few lines from 
the partial dissenting opinion of then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in 
State Farm.168 This is, indeed, one of the key cases governing agency 
 
interim final rule that had “enumerated unlawful practices” and discussing reasons the agency 
viewed it as legally vulnerable). For cases discussing and rejecting the adequacy of the litigation-
risk rationale for a deregulatory policy shift, see Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 420–33 
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (rejecting the DACA reversal as rooted in legal error, illogical reasoning, and 
inadequately analyzed litigation-risk arguments since either maintaining DACA or rescinding it 
could lead to litigation, as well as failures to analyze factors required by consistency doctrine), 
and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1037–46 
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (discussing the inadequacy of a litigation-risk rationale among other infirmities 
in the DACA rescission), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476, 500–03 (9th Cir. 2018) (reviewing a litigation-risk 
claim and finding it pretextual and a post hoc rationale). See also infra note 165. 
 165. See, e.g., NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 463 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that 
litigation risks and “serious doubts” rationales for a regulatory reversal are inadequate without a 
more full justification, due to the risk that these rationales would insulate policy changes from 
meaningful judicial review); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 215 (D.D.C. 2018) (same). 
 166. The cases parsed in this subpart are analyzed for their emphasis on contingent facts and 
past reasoning in Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10. Here, they set the stage for 
assessing the legal adequacy of statutory abnegation for regulatory reversals. 
 167. See supra Part I.A (discussing such abnegation-based actions and noting citations in some 
actions to consistency doctrine). 
 168. The key language is in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For agencies citing 
this language, see, e.g., Intention to Review and Rescind or Revise the Clean Water Rule, supra 
note 85, at 12,532; see also Glider Repeal Proposal, supra note 99, at 53,443 and accompanying 
text. 
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policy changes and deregulatory shifts. Oddly, however, agencies citing 
it and quoting Rehnquist do not include discussion of the case’s 
majority ruling, which rejected a Reagan-era deregulatory action as 
inadequately justified and stated what was required of agencies 
proposing a policy change.169 Before turning to other consistency 
precedents, State Farm’s two contrary facets are worth exploration. 
State Farm is undoubtedly the foundational modern case 
governing judicial review of agency policy change—in that case, in a 
deregulatory direction.170 In addition to embracing “hard look review” 
and articulating the requisites of “reasoned decisionmaking,” the 
Court set forth the key elements of consistency doctrine.171 The Court 
was confronted with the National Highway Traffic & Safety 
Administration’s rejection of Standard 208, a regulation requiring cars 
to be equipped with either airbags or automatic seatbelts. The agency, 
however, only offered an explanation for one of the regulatory 
reversals and argued for minimal judicial scrutiny of its actions because 
they were deregulatory.172 
The Court rejected this argument for minimal scrutiny, 
emphasizing the need for an agency to confront its old policy and offer 
an explanation for the change. The Court stated that when an agency 
is “changing its course,” it is required to “supply a reasoned analysis 
for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency 
does not act in the first instance.”173 The Court easily determined that 
abandoning the airbags option was arbitrary and capricious because 
the agency “apparently gave no consideration whatever” to keeping 
one of the safety strategies.174 As the Court stated, “[n]ot one sentence 
of its rulemaking statement discusses the airbags-only option.”175 
The State Farm Court declined to submit deregulatory action to 
some less rigorous standard of review for several reasons. First, the 
 
 169. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 170. See generally State Farm, 463 U.S. 29. 
 171. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Story of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S. 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.: Law, Science and Politics in the Administrative 
State, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 334 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (discussing the case’s 
history and its importance). 
 172. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 30. 
 173. Id. at 42. The tail clause, stating more is required than “when an agency does not act in 
the first instance,” rejects arguments that a deregulatory act is akin to an agency’s choice not to 
act or regulate, a setting subject either to no judicial review or deferential review. See supra note 
135 and accompanying text (discussing law on unreviewability). 
 174. See id. at 46. 
 175. Id. at 48; see also id. at 50–51 (stating that the “agency submitted no reasons at all”). 
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APA made no such distinction.176 Second, the enabling act’s language 
also provided no basis for treating differently initial regulatory actions 
and rescissions of past actions.177 Moreover, the Court reasoned that 
agency declinations to act—usually subject to minimal review—are 
“substantially different” from an agency’s “revocation of an extant 
regulation.”178 Such revocation “constitutes a reversal of the agency’s 
former views as to the proper course.”179 The Court stated that a 
“settled course of behavior embodies the agency’s informed judgment” 
that the earlier action “will carry out the policies committed to it by 
Congress.”180 This creates “at least a presumption that those policies 
will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.”181 
The Court acknowledged that agencies can seek to change policy, 
as had already been long established.182 But the Court linked the 
possibility of change not to politics, presidential priorities, or statutory 
language, but to the need for “ample latitude to ‘adapt their rules and 
policies to the demands of changing circumstances.’”183 It reiterated the 
importance of “changing circumstances” and stated that the 
presumption is “against changes in current policy that are not justified 
by the rulemaking record.”184 Hence, the State Farm Court left room 
for agency policy change but emphasized how past agency reasoning, 
the record, and underlying circumstances would need to justify a 
change. 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, which was labeled as part 
concurrence and part dissent, suggested that a change of 
administration and policy priorities could be among the grounds for an 
agency policy shift. These factors could provide a “reasonable basis for 
an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its 
 
 176. Id. at 41–42. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 41. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 41–42. 
 181. Id. (quoting Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807–08 
(1973)). For analysis of statutory interpretation and judicial review of “longstanding” agency 
interpretations, see generally Anita Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1823 (2015). Krishnakumar calls for more rigorous review of agency change 
if it is based on political factors but supports deference if it is rooted in changed circumstances, 
expertise, and workability. Id. at 1877–79. 
 182. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42. 
 183. See id. 
 184. Id. (emphasis in original) 
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programs and regulations.”185 
Although Justice Rehnquist’s view did not gain majority support 
in State Farm, it was quoted in the more recent FCC v. Fox186 case, in a 
majority opinion that further fleshed out the general framework for the 
permissible role of politics in agency policy change.187 The Court in Fox 
found permissible the FCC’s changed approach to “fleeting obscenity” 
on television. The splintered opinions in Fox render it difficult to 
determine exactly what views garnered majority support.188 Change 
does not, by itself, trigger any heightened scrutiny, but all Justices 
agreed the agency would have to confront the old policy and explain 
the changed new policy.189 
The Justices in Fox differed on what had to be weighed. Writing 
for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that agencies would have to 
“show that there are good reasons for the new policy.”190 All Justices 
appeared to agree on this need for “good reasons.”191 The Scalia 
opinion ostensibly garnered majority support for most of its discussion, 
but it left the law a bit uncertain due to pointed differences in the 
Justice Kennedy concurrence; Kennedy’s vote was needed to make a 
majority. The Scalia opinion stated the following, in language that has 
become a common part of 2017 and 2018 statutory-abnegation 
justifications: an agency “need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction 
that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the 
old one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, 
that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be 
better.”192 The Court also acknowledged that because past policies will 
 
 185. Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As long as the agency 
remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records 
and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.”). 
 186. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
 187. Id. at 515; see also Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 23, at 129–33 (analyzing additional 
cases developing the law between State Farm and Fox). 
 188. See also Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 23, at 129 (highlighting doctrinal uncertainty 
left by Fox). 
 189. Fox, 556 U.S. at 514.  
 190. Id. at 515. 
 191. The dissenters would have required more, but they indicated no disagreement with the 
need for “good reasons.” Id. at 550–51 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. at 515. Justice Kennedy ostensibly joined this opinion, but his concurrence—which 
was needed to make a Court majority—emphasized the need for factual justification and 
expressed concern with agencies exercising “unbridled discretion” or ignoring contrary or 
“inconvenient” facts, especially since many agency actions are built on “factual findings.” Id. at 
536–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Encino Motorcars, LLC 
v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) focused even more on facts. See infra notes 195–99 and 
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tend to change the status quo by engendering reliance interests and 
because prior agency actions often involve “factual findings,” 
reviewing courts will tend to have to look at more with a policy change 
than with a policy generated anew.193 The dissent argued that agencies 
must always explain why the change was made and agreed with the 
majority that agencies must engage with prior facts and justifications.194 
Surprisingly, almost all of the 2017 and 2018 deregulatory actions 
and the statutory-abnegation actions discussed here failed to grapple 
with the Encino Motorcars decision.195 This 2016 case, decided after 
Justice Scalia’s death, included a clearer majority opinion written by 
Justice Kennedy. Encino Motorcars lacked the uncertainty in Fox 
created by multiple opinions quibbling over ostensible majority 
language. The Court rejected as inadequately justified the agency’s 
revised policy about employment status in the context of car 
dealerships. Agencies making a policy change must, as always, “give 
adequate reasons” for their decisions.196 And the Encino Court stated 
that, as under the typical “hard look review” articulated in State Farm, 
this means that an agency “must examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choices made.”197 The 
Court again emphasized the need for assessment of any “reliance 
interests” and, quoting Fox, stated that a “reasoned explanation is 
needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were 
engendered by the prior policy.”198 And “unexplained inconsistency” 
is a basis for holding a new agency action “arbitrary and capricious.”199 
The Encino Court notably did not quote or refine Fox’s language about 
the agency change not needing to be “better” or that an agency’s 
“belie[f]” that it was better would be enough, leaving its continued 
force uncertain. 
None of the 2017 and 2018 abnegation actions discuss the 
implications of Massachusetts v. EPA,200 which involved arguments 
 
accompanying text.  
 193. Fox, 556 U.S. at 515. 
 194. Id. at 551 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 195. Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125–26. 
 196. See id. at 2125–26. 
 197. Id. at 2125. 
 198. Id. at 2126 (quoting Fox, 556 U.S. at 515–16). 
 199. Id. at 2125 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 981 (2005)). 
 200. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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based on both abnegation and presidential power in an attempt to 
justify the agency’s policy reversal about its own power to address 
climate change.201 The Court’s opinion, however, strongly rejected the 
attempted abnegation and declined to accept presidential political 
priorities as justification for the petition denial and ongoing inaction 
on climate change.202 The Massachusetts v. EPA Court ordered EPA to 
reassess its action in light of the statute’s procedural and substantive 
requirements.203 Neither the abnegation claim nor the presidential-
priorities argument triggered any lessened burden of agency 
justification. If anything, the decision is an unusually strong affirmation 
of the need for expertise, rational decisionmaking, engagement with 
science and facts, and apolitical agencies, at least in the sense of 
requiring that statutory choices be the paramount shaper of agency 
power and actions.204  
The subsequent Michigan v. EPA decision did not involve a policy 
change, but it did involve abnegation of an agency’s authority to 
consider the costs associated with its regulation of air toxins from 
power plants. Much like Massachusetts, Michigan prompted a judicial 
skewering of the agency’s “interpretive gerrymanders” and selective 
attention to “context” to justify the regulatory choice.205 The Court 
likewise compelled the agency to go back and fully attend to the 
statutorily required analysis of regulatory effects. 
In fact, none of these cases even implicitly indicates that 
deregulation based on abnegation alone somehow eliminates other 
agency requirements for justifying a policy choice or shift. And no 
opinion provides that a policy revision aligned with a presidential edict 
 
 201. The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA did not emphasize how changes of statutory 
interpretation would interact with consistency doctrine; this may explain the failure of agencies 
to cite and grapple with its lessons in the many deregulatory statutory-abnegation actions 
discussed here. Massachusetts v. EPA has key language rejecting the adequacy of EPA’s asserted 
lack of power and requiring analysis shaped by statutory criteria. See id. at 528–35. 
 202. Id. at 513–14, 532–35. 
 203. Id. at 532–35.  
 204. For analysis of Massachusetts and its emphasis on expertise and deemphasis of politics as 
a rationale for regulatory action, see generally David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: 
Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095 
(2008); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2007). 
 205. See Michigan v. EPA, 138 S. Ct. 2699, 2707–11 (2015) (rejecting EPA’s claim that it 
lacked the power to consider costs associated with its regulation to reduce risks of mercury 
pollution from power plants). The dissent, by Justice Kagan and joined by three other Justices, 
agreed with a general default rule that reasonable agency action requires considering costs unless 
precluded by the statute. Id. at 2716 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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more easily surmounts these requirements. At most, one sentence in 
Fox—suggesting that agencies need not show that a revised policy is 
“better”—provides agencies with a cushion; if all of the law and facts 
are in rough balance, then an agency will likely succeed in its policy 
revision. 
But these cases all share the requirement that agencies must 
engage with the “facts and circumstances that underlie” an earlier 
action. Such “underlying facts and circumstances” will usually be 
repeatedly stated and linked to relevant law by agencies in explaining 
their action initially and later in defending it in court. Hence, an agency 
proposing a policy change will need to engage with these earlier stated 
“facts and circumstances” that had been viewed as justifying a different 
legal view and course of action.206 Yet none of the recent agency 
abnegations meaningfully grappled with the factual findings, 
reasoning, or impact of the past or revised policy choice, as required by 
Supreme Court doctrine. Encino’s 2016 decision—a modest 
embellishment and clarification of the law after State Farm and Fox—
stated that “unexplained inconsistency” is not permissible.207 
 
 206. During the usual litigation over a major rule, those justifications will be reiterated and 
likely sharpened. See Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1405–07 (discussing why 
the process of promulgating and defending regulation will lead to further explication and 
elucidation). 
 207. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (quoting Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (alterations omitted)). 
Such policies can be established by informal adjudicatory choices and changed in similar 
subsequent actions; change must still be justified by the agency. See, e.g., American Bar Ass’n v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-2476, 2019 WL 858770, at *19–21 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2019) (finding an 
unacknowledged and unexplained policy shift on loan forgiveness to be arbitrary and capricious). 
Policy change based on pretextual claims or without a record basis also can fall under this body 
of law. For example, two trial courts rejected the Department of Commerce’s decision to add 
citizenship-status questions to the census questionnaire despite previous Department views to the 
contrary and internal expert findings of the Census Bureau about likely effects which would 
undercut the claimed rationale. See generally New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 
3d 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (extensively documenting, based on the agency record, inconsistencies 
with the claimed rationale for adding a citizenship question to the census form and faulting the 
agency for failure to explain changed conclusions about the effect of adding such a question), cert. 
granted before judgment, Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 953 (2019); California v. 
Ross, No. 18-cv-01865, 2019 WL 1052434, at *66–69 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019) (finding the addition 
of a citizenship question to be based on pretextual grounds and to be an arbitrary and capricious 
decision, with agency conclusions lacking evidentiary support). Both trial courts separately 
looked at materials outside the record due to infirmities and conflicts in the agency’s claims and 
justifications, but the courts broke out extra-record considerations from review of the action and 
conclusions based on the agency’s own compiled record. The Solicitor General’s Supreme Court 
merits brief faults the Southern District of New York trial court for “extra-record” discovery but 
only glancingly address lower-court findings based on the agency’s own administrative record. 
Brief for Petitioners at 9–10, 16, 55, Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 953 (Mar. 6, 
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Recent abnegation-based deregulatory proposals emphasize the 
possibility of politically responsive policy change. However, they 
disregard or barely acknowledge the persistent doctrinal emphasis on 
agency obligations to address “contingencies” that justified the past 
action and to engage in a rigorous comparison of the old and new 
policy.208 Most recent shifts accordingly seem fated for eventual judicial 
rejection unless they succeed in provoking a major shift in 
administrative law. 
If agency abnegation is intended as a sound regulatory and 
litigation strategy—an assertion I question below—then it almost 
seems rooted in a logic error, mistaking the possibility of policy change 
for a sufficient rationale, while ignoring the conditions and hurdles that 
an agency must surmount to succeed in such a policy change. As a 
result, courts have repeatedly faulted Trump-administration agencies 
for failing to provide required process before making a policy change; 
for failing to engage with and provide comparative analysis of 
underlying facts, circumstances, and reasoning previously viewed as 
relevant; and for failing to provide the new “good reasons” for the 
policy change.209 
B. The Doctrinal Disadvantages of Abnegation 
Because agencies relying on abnegation to make a policy change 
have focused on statutory language while neglecting to engage with 
past explanations, underlying facts, changing conditions, and reliance 
interests, they appear to be repeatedly running afoul of the 
requirements of consistency doctrine. But abnegation is also 
strategically puzzling, even if one looks past the mandates of 
consistency doctrine. As shown in this Part, abnegation is usually 
unnecessary and legally disadvantageous for the agency under the 
prevailing, deferential standards of review. 
Both before and after the Supreme Court decided Chevron, 
 
2019) (No. 18-966).  
 208. See Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1376. 
 209. For analysis of these deregulatory actions and judicial rejections, see id. at 1408–17. For 
a recent tally and exploration of reasons for this high percentage of agency litigation losses, see 
Barbash & Paul, supra note 43 (documenting and discussing high percentage of losses); see also 
Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems (So Far) of Trump’s Deregulatory 
Binge, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 16–47 (2018) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Unreasonable 
Delays] (analyzing the first wave of Trump-administration stay-and-delay actions and judicial 
rejections); infra Part III.D (reviewing opinions rejecting the adequacy of statutory-abnegation 
rationales for policy reversals).  
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agencies have routinely justified their actions by weaving together 
interpretations of enabling legislation with choices rooted in their 
regulatory expertise.210 Because statutes rarely mandate just one course 
of action, and empirical study usually reveals social problems as having 
numerous causes and presenting tradeoffs for any regulatory response, 
agencies typically have latitude to make context-rich judgments that 
draw on the agency’s experience and expertise.211 The Skidmore212 
decision created what is now the default deference regime, used when 
an agency has acted outside of a notice-and-comment setting.213 It also 
emphasizes deference as grounded in an agency’s expertise and the 
thoroughness of its reasoning, among a number of factors now often 
characterized as “Mead-Skidmore”214 sliding-scale deference.215 
In contrast, abnegation, with its near-exclusive focus on statutory 
language to claim obligatory policy change, is a recipe for reduced or 
no deference under this regime. In adopting such a narrow focus, 
recent agency attempts at policy change via abnegation have seldom 
relied on expert analysis of statutory factors and on-the-ground effects 
of regulatory policy. If the agency is claiming mere obedience to an all-
knowing and constraining Congress, then the traditional expertise-
based justifications for any deference fall away. 
 
 210. See Herz, supra note 162, at 1897 (describing deference to agencies as long rooted in 
delegated authority and expertise, well before Chevron, and discussing NLRB v. Hearst Pubs., 
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 114–15, 130–31 (1944)). 
 211. Agencies’ interpretive roles are intertwined with their congressionally delegated 
policymaking roles, both of which draw on their expertise. See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to 
Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2015) (discussing agencies’ delegated roles and development of 
“craft” expertise); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. 
L. REV. 937, 956–65 (2018) (discussing delegated roles and conceptions of “interpretation” and 
“policymaking” in the Chevron case and as allocated by regulatory statutes). See generally Wendy 
E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019 (2015) (explaining congressionally delegated agency roles and 
expertise, benefits of deliberative procedures, and tensions between presidential control through 
OIRA and agencies’ delegated roles). 
 212. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 213. See id. at 140 (stating factors now called sliding-scale review, including “consistency” as 
a favorable factor); see also Peter L. Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them 
“Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1153–72 (2012) [hereinafter 
Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing] (discussing the applicability and conceptual differences of 
judicial review under Chevron and Skidmore). 
 214. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 215. Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing, supra note 213, at 1154. Mead made clear that 
Skidmore provides the scope-of-review framework when the underlying law or the agency’s 
procedural choices render Chevron deference inapplicable. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234–35. 
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Statutory abnegation is also a disadvantageous strategy when 
assessed under Chevron’s famed Two-Step framework. As introduced 
earlier (and much applied in the courts and analyzed in scholarship), 
judicial scrutiny under Chevron toggles between zero deference at Step 
One, if Congress has addressed the “precise question at issue,” and 
substantial deference at Step Two, if the statute is silent, leaves a gap, 
or is ambiguous regarding how the agency should regulate.216 In the 
zero-deference Step One setting, the agency and court must agree on 
that single answer.217 At Step Two, however, the Court in Chevron 
recognized that agencies frequently have to make policy choices that 
balance conflicting statutory policies, require the exercise of discretion 
delegated to the agency by Congress, and depend on political and 
pragmatic calculations about how best to regulate.218 And where the 
action involves technical and scientific expertise, as risk-regulating 
agencies’ actions often do, the Court indicated that judicial deference 
to an agency is especially appropriate.219 Although Chevron deference 
is less favorable to agencies than once thought, agencies still benefit 
from the deference afforded by Step Two in defending regulatory 
choices.220 
The subsequent Mead case both built on Chevron and also 
clarified when and why Chevron deference applies.221 It, too, creates an 
unfavorable standard for agencies seeking to roll back regulations 
through abnegation. When agencies make a reasoned choice from 
among a range of possible options, that choice occurs in a setting 
characterized by two types of political accountability. Although some 
courts and scholars have read Chevron as reflecting just one type of 
political accountability—the president’s electoral accountability—the 
opinion actually is built on several rationales. The Court emphasized 
legislative supremacy–based accountability in the form of Congress 
choosing to delegate to the agency (not the courts) and Congress 
setting the criteria for action to be weighed by that expert delegate.222 
 
 216. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984). 
 217. Id. at 842. 
 218. Id. at 843–45; Siegel, supra note 211, at 962–65. 
 219. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45, 861–66. 
 220. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1150 (2008) (finding consistency remains an important factor for judicial deference and agency 
victory, even in cases where Chevron is applied). 
 221. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001). 
 222. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45, 861–66. 
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It also, in more frequently cited language, emphasized electoral and 
hierarchical accountability, contrasting agency leadership’s fealty to 
the elected president as well as Congress delegating turf to an agency 
with the alternative of reposing primary interpretive power in judges 
lacking expertise or political accountability.223 Chevron involved 
notice-and-comment rulemaking with its usual quasi-legislative forms 
of participation and transparency in reasoning, but the decision itself 
left unclear if that procedural mode was also an underpinning of the 
case’s call for judicial deference.224 That question was resolved in Mead, 
where the Court emphasized that the procedural accountability 
associated with quasi-legislative rulemaking also justifies deference. 
This procedural context entails transparent, participatory, and 
deliberative notice-and-comment proceedings where Congress 
intended agencies to act with the “force of law.”225 
So when agencies argue, as they usually can, that they are acting 
in a Chevron Step Two setting, they benefit from substantial judicial 
deference of several types. Agencies, not courts, have been delegated 
the expert task by Congress. They hence can claim legislative 
supremacy–based legitimacy. Agencies also can claim special expertise 
about the implications of their choices. They know best—or at least 
know more than courts—how competing tasks or policies should best 
be reconciled, due to their familiarity with statutory and regulatory law 
and ongoing work with all affected stakeholders. They know the law, 
plus they are deeply familiar with on-the-ground effects of policy 
choices.226 This is a quintessential attribute of expertise-based 
accountability. They are also subject to the president’s electoral 
accountability, and they generally must use a transparent, participatory 
process to act with the force of law. This is a process-based form of 
 
 223. Id. at 865–66 (discussing agency authority and, “within the limits of that delegation, 
properly rely[ing] upon the incumbent administration’s view of wise policy”). 
 224. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1171–72 (2014) (discussing usual procedural prerequisites for agency claims 
of deference after Mead); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 883, 852–63 (2001) (discussing triggers for Chevron deference and emphasizing procedural 
accountability provided through notice-and-comment rulemaking like that generating the policy 
upheld in Chevron).  
 225. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. The Court in Mead also discussed formal adjudications as a setting 
justifying Chevron deference. See id. at 227–31 (2001). See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency 
Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004) (discussing agency options of 
policymaking modes post-Mead, and their repercussions). 
 226. See generally Shapiro, supra note 211 (discussing forms of expertise wielded and 
developed by agencies). 
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accountability; courts look for agency fealty to such participatory 
process and full and adequate explanation.227 
Due to these differences in expertise and linked forms of 
accountability, courts reviewing an action in a Chevron Step Two 
setting will look for a reasonable agency choice, not necessarily the 
choice that the court would have made; the agency’s legal 
interpretation need only be “permissible” or “reasonable.” This all 
means that an agency setting itself up for review under the favorable 
Chevron Step Two posture—which requires a successful claim that 
statutory language leaves room for agency discretion—can point to 
several forms of political accountability justifying judicial deference to 
agency views. If agencies succeed in this claim, and underlying facts, 
science, or data provide an adequate basis, agencies are advantaged by 
how Chevron and Mead provide agencies with room for a range of 
permissible policy choices. 
Furthermore, agencies acting in a Chevron Step Two setting also 
protect their power in a second way. They preserve the ability to adjust 
their statutory interpretation and resulting policy in the future.228 Step 
Two interpretive choices, by definition and as explained above, are 
permissible choices in a setting that usually provides multiple such 
options (provided other choices can be justified in light of relevant facts 
and likely regulatory effects). Agencies always need to react to a 
changing world and often will develop better means to achieve a 
statutory end. Chevron itself involved just such a policy shift. EPA 
changed its approach to factory pollution in response to growing 
regulatory sophistication about, and interest in, use of market-based 
regulatory strategies. An undefined statutory term gave EPA latitude 
to do so.229 Thus, Chevron Step Two is often available to an agency and 
is a favorable posture for eventual judicial review. It preserves agency 
flexibility to later adjust its action without necessarily triggering 
arguments that the agency had shifted policy or changed its statutory 
interpretation.230 In other words, an agency that consistently identifies 
 
 227. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 224, at 1171–72 (discussing usual procedural 
prerequisites for agency claims of deference after Mead). 
 228. Chevron itself emphasized EPA as an agency learning from experience and consistently 
and permissibly interpreting governing language “flexibly” in order to “engage in informed 
rulemaking.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 549–
53 (1985) (discussing how Chevron and State Farm can be reconciled, and noting that the Court 
in Chevron did not analyze the agency’s action under the framework for review of agency policy 
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a range of permissible options to address a social challenge is, when 
later embracing one of those choices, making a modest policy shift that 
may not involve any changed view of its statutory powers. 
Chevron does, however, come with a downside that agencies may 
be seeking to avoid through abnegation claims, even though that means 
foregoing the benefits of Chevron Step Two deference. Because 
Chevron Step Two involves an agency choice and requires justification, 
it shares a key attribute with consistency-doctrine cases. Chevron 
necessarily requires the agency to explain based on policy grounds why 
its choice is well founded, or at least not arbitrary and capricious, when 
examined in light of statutory factors and full engagement with 
underlying data or science.231 Prominent scholars soundly argue that 
Step Two reasonableness analysis is in fact a variant of, or at least 
overlaps with, the “arbitrary and capricious” analysis governed by the 
Overton Park232 and State Farm cases.233 This other linked body of law 
emphatically requires agencies to engage with evidence and criticism, 
and to offer “reasoned decisionmaking” to justify its decisions.234 
Such full engagement under “arbitrary and capricious” and “hard 
look review” involves several burdens that agencies changing policy 
may yearn to avoid. First, agencies will need to engage with all arguably 
salient science or data. They will need to respond to substantive 
comments and criticisms offered by those participating in the process 
and provide rationales for choices or changes that also engage relevant 
science and past agency views and conclusions.235 The track record of 
the earlier policy, changes in societal conditions, and shifts in reliance 
on the regulation must be assessed. Such work is labor intensive and 
will slow down any change. Second, the science or facts may, when 
 
change and “hard look review” set forth in State Farm). 
 231. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 853–65 (tracing EPA’s policy shifts, underlying support for the new 
“bubble strategy,” and permissible nature of such expertise-based changes through “informed 
rulemaking”). Mead further emphasized the importance of deliberative procedures for generating 
actions worthy of Chevron Step Two deference. See supra notes 221–27 and accompanying text 
(discussing questions resolved through Mead).  
 232. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1972). 
 233. Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1253, 1268–69 (1997) (stating that despite Chevron’s use of the term “interpretation,” the 
actual opinion involved an assessment of how factual and economic rationales supported the 
agency’s reasoning). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 555, 565–66 (2011) (discussing different agency and judicial tasks when governing 
legislation requires the agency to provide “factually grounded explanation” as opposed to one 
grounded in “value judgment[s]”). 
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reviewed in court, present a genuine barrier to a regulatory reversal 
that must be shown to be a reasonable choice in light of such empirical 
materials. Similarly, problematic facts may be politically disastrous.236 
For example, if a regulatory reversal will lead to a wave of illness or 
deaths, or an increase in pollution under a provision requiring 
“emissions reductions,” the agency understandably (but not legally) 
may hope to avoid a firestorm of criticism by ignoring such facts and 
by dodging the requirement to highlight inconsistency with protective 
statutory criteria.237 
Furthermore, changes will arise between the initial regulatory 
action and the later move to deregulate. Agencies must assess the track 
record of compliance and other regulatory effects and changes while 
also considering the effects of the proposed change. As discussed 
above, the Court’s mandate that agencies assess reliance interests when 
making a policy change is directed at this sort of on-the-ground 
change.238 Old agency predictions about the regulation sought to be 
changed will often prove inaccurate. Regulated entities or companies 
eager to meet a new market demand quickly figure out means to 
comply with a regulatory mandate, often at a far more reasonable cost 
than initially predicted.239 And societal conditions also change, 
requiring agencies to update their assumptions. In fact, any legal choice 
will lead citizens and economic players to capitalize on new 
opportunities or minimize compliance costs. Such adjustments and 
 
 236. Cf. J.B. Ruhl & Kyle Robisch, Agencies Running from Agency Discretion, 58 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 97, 102–03, 109–10 (2016) (exploring agencies avoiding work and potential 
political costs by claiming they have no discretion due to doctrine developed at the intersection 
of two laws governing risks to endangered species). 
 237. The CPP’s replacement is predicted to increase pollution and cause a substantial increase 
in deaths. This revelation spurred substantial adverse press and comment. See Lisa Friedman, 
Costs of New Coal Rules: Up to 1,400 More Deaths a Year, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/climate/epa-coal-pollution-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/
EBJ6-YWE7] (reviewing the proposed rule and additional expected deaths, statements of 
President Trump about helping coal country, and other coal-linked rollbacks); see also supra notes 
107–14 and accompanying text (discussing agency efforts to avoid disclosure of how the tip-
regulation change would shift wealth away from servers and to management).  
 238. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing such requirements in cases setting forth key elements 
of consistency doctrine). 
 239. When EPA denied petitions to reconsider the CPP, it found that clean-energy shifts from 
coal to gas were happening at lower cost and more rapidly than originally anticipated. See supra 
notes 64–66 and accompanying text. See generally Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation 
Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395 (2009) 
(describing and analyzing overallocation of pollution rights under cap-and-trade regimes and 
reasons compliance tends to be easier than predicted).  
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market benefits of past regulation can give rise to new, formidable 
analytical burdens as well as legal and political barriers to change.240 
So, at Chevron Step Two, agencies are advantaged by deferential 
judicial review and benefit from retained policy flexibility, but this does 
not mean the work will be easy or fast. Agencies still need to engage 
and make arguments in favor of the deregulatory move or other policy 
shift where science, potential harms, and logic might present serious 
justificatory challenges. In addition, a choice that is acknowledged to 
be a discretionary policy change, not a legally mandated change, may 
create a political tempest. Blame for an unpopular change will fall on 
the agency or the president, not on Congress for some earlier allegedly 
imprudent statute or on a court for an allegedly unsound decision. 
Despite recurrent claims that agencies are eager to grab power and 
turf, scholars of regulation often observe tendencies to avoid risk, 
dodge work, and shun publicity.241 Hence, deregulation through 
statutory abnegation confounds the turf-expansion expectation in two 
ways. Agencies are denying themselves turf, plus they appear to be 
avoiding work. 
Thus, to distill this section’s discussion, viewed from the 
perspective of doctrinal frames and legal prospects, statutory 
abnegation necessarily puts the agency into a disadvantageous posture, 
creating several pathways to defeat in the courts. The infirmities of not 
addressing other consistency-doctrine hurdles is, for now, put to the 
side. First, if an agency claims only one possible interpretive choice, a 
 
 240. See Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, supra note 58, at 1088–92 (discussing how regulatory 
regimes can lead to investment and entrench such regulation). 
 241. See Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the 
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1711–15 (2008) (discussing the problem of 
regulations stuck in rulemaking “ruts”); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory 
Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2003) [hereinafter Buzbee, 
Recognizing the Regulatory Commons] (identifying as “regulatory commons” settings where 
shared or uncertain regulatory turfs create incentives for potential regulators to leave social ills 
unaddressed); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 297–98 (1998) (identifying problems of rigidified law 
and regulation, and advocating “experimentalist” strategies conducive to new information and 
legal improvement); Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 304 (1999) (discussing many 
reasons for agency “slippage”); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional 
Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 923–37 (2005) (questioning the agency empire-building hypothesis); 
see also MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS: POLITICS AND 
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 151–72 (2000) (observing, after discussing 
bureaucrats’ actions within multiple agencies during the deregulatory Reagan administration, that 
depending on context, political and career regulators at times will seek to reduce agency power 
or avoid work and risk, not expand agency authority). 
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court has to agree with that choice for the agency to win on that 
interpretive issue.242 Any different reading by the court means the 
agency loses. Second, even if a court agrees that the agency choice is 
legally permissible, the agency loses if a court concludes that the 
agency erred in viewing itself as constrained to that single permissible 
interpretation.243 Even without affording deference to the agency, the 
court might see the enabling act as providing an array of regulatory 
choices. If so, the agency loses and will eventually have to try again. If 
the agency had a range of choices, it needs to explain why it chose one 
versus another, attending to relevant facts and statutory criteria 
guiding such choices.244 Third—in a variant on the second 
permutation—if the reviewing court identifies some statutory silence, 
gap, or ambiguity that, under Chevron, translates into the agency 
having some factually and contextually informed range of 
policymaking choices, then the erroneous claimed lack of discretion 
could also lead to judicial rejection.245 Thus, the self-constraining 
agency that relies on a statutory-abnegation claim heightens risks of 
judicial reversal and also limits its future flexibility. 
III.  RATIONALIZING THE STATUTORY-ABNEGATION STRATEGY, 
AND NORMATIVE CONCERNS 
Agency policy shifts relying on statutory abnegation are thus, if 
measured by likely long-term legal success, a puzzler. Agencies are 
both disadvantaging themselves and embracing a lessened view of their 
 
 242. See NextEra Desert Ctr. Blythe, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 852 F.3d 1118, 
1122–23 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding the agency erred regarding its own authority and hence remand 
was required); Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (rejecting agency action due to 
agency error about its own statutory authority); Hemel & Nielson, supra note 23, at 818–21 
(analyzing cases holding that agency errors about the nature of their own authority must be 
rejected). 
 243. Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35, 41–43, 45, 50 n.18 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(noting agency error about the nature of its own legal authority requires judicial rejection, and 
parsing views of the Solicitor for the Bureau of Land Management and the Department of the 
Interior to determine if error regarding authority tainted a resulting regulation). 
 244. For example, language might leave room for a few choices, but the effects of those 
choices might make clear that some choices, in actual application and in light of underlying facts 
about effects or business dynamics, would violate a statute’s protective goals. This is part of the 
logic of judicial review under Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). An 
agency can be acting within a correct understanding of its governing statutory criteria, but it will 
still need to show its actual choice is not “arbitrary [and] capricious” under the APA, and this 
involves “inquiry into the facts” that should be “searching and careful” to ensure the agency did 
not make a “clear error of judgment.” Id. at 416. 
 245. Hemel & Nielson, supra note 23, at 802–03. 
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own powers. But if one takes seriously the reality that regulation 
involves human institutions guided by law but operating in a political 
matrix, then agency statutory abnegation becomes both more 
understandable and problematic. As long posited by positive political 
theory, all regulatory actors will behave strategically in light of 
incentives they face and in light of one another’s actions; the political 
calculus may not mesh with an obedient focus on what the law seems 
to require.246 This Part operates at two levels. First, it illuminates why 
agencies and their leaders might opt for statutory abnegation when 
other approaches would promise more long-term legal success. 
But this Part’s second major section argues that the very political 
incentives driving abnegation reveal the shaky foundations of 
arguments that politicized regulation should be embraced or even 
trigger some lesser level of judicial scrutiny. And agencies utilizing 
abnegation rationales should not be given a pass from obligations to 
act in conformity with the usual legal and analytical hurdles, whether 
the action is new or a policy change. Much of administrative law is 
designed to nudge or compel agencies to exercise their delegated 
expertise in conformity with legislative instructions and in quasi-
democratic, transparent, and accountable fashion. As attempted, 
agency disavowals of authority have been accompanied by skirting of 
procedural and substantive hurdles that have long been required in 
order to foster sound and accountable regulatory actions. Presidential 
mandates and agency obedience constitute one form of political 
accountability, but in the abnegation setting all other norms and 
practices of political accountability have been neglected. As argued 
below, well-established doctrine appropriately rewards actions 
reflecting respect for multiple sources of political accountability. As 
courts have found, presidential edicts are inadequate justifications for 
inexpert agency rollbacks that dodge full engagement with 
congressional requirements, do not analyze underlying science and 
data, and fail to grapple with past reasoning and regulatory 
contestation. 
A. Abnegation as a Surrender or Expansion of Agency Power 
A longstanding antiregulatory argument is that agencies must be 
subject to checks or they will predictably seek to expand their turf and 
aggrandize their authority, burdening society with growing bodies of 
 
 246. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (introducing Positive Political Theory and 
citing literature). 
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regulation.247 This claim persists but has, at this point, been subject to 
cogent theoretical and empirical historical critiques.248 There is little 
reason to anticipate that agencies will predictably skew towards 
overreach or self-aggrandizement. Agency abnegation, however, also 
illuminates a fundamental lack of nuance at the heart of the agency 
“empire building” hypothesis. As shown by the wave of agency 
attempts at abnegation, agencies can simultaneously deny themselves 
power to address a risk and, at the same time, claim newly expansive 
powers to redefine their authority. This section briefly explains this 
seeming paradox of power denial and power claiming. 
Agencies are, as indicated by their very label, agents of Congress 
and the president. They are handed tasks and turf defined by statutes. 
They wield that power subject to additional delegation of authority 
from the president, personnel appointments, and political oversight 
and direction from the president and sometimes Congress. But 
congressionally delegated tasks and presidential priorities can and 
often do clash. In fact, statutes empowering and obligating agencies 
often reflect past bargains and priorities that may not mesh with any 
branch’s later policy preferences.249 Nonetheless, the choices and 
compromises embodied in statutes live on due to the usual hurdles to 
enacting any legislation.250 
Any deviation from Congress’s statutory delegation—whether 
that deviation cuts in a regulatory or deregulatory direction—
ultimately involves an agency seeking to define the extent of its own 
power. One sort of deviation could be in the form claimed by William 
 
 247. See Levinson, supra note 241, at 923–37 (presenting and questioning the “empire-
building” hypothesis). 
 248. See, e.g., id.; see also GOLDEN, supra note 241, at 151–72 (questioning the “rational actor” 
theory’s expectations of self-interested agency officials’ behavior resulting in shirking and budget 
maximization, and instead observing an array of responses to agency power, with agency cultures, 
personalities, and career and political appointees’ different incentives leading to varied actions); 
Blais & Wagner, supra note 241, at 1711–15 (discussing the problem of long-unamended 
regulations); Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 241, at 5–6 (identifying 
“regulatory commons” dynamics and how regulatory overlap and uncertain turf can create 
incentives for potential regulators to leave social ills unaddressed); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 241, 
at 297–98 (identifying problems of regulatory stasis and advocating regulatory design that would 
generate new information and trigger regulatory adjustments); Farber, supra note 241, at 304 
(discussing forms of agency “slippage” and reasons for agency delay and inaction). 
 249. See Patricia M. Wald, The “New Administrative Law”—With the Same Old Judges in It?, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 647, 651 (discussing agencies seeking to carry out policies of the “current 
administration” that “chafe at the bridle of old statutes” and resulting tensions with reviewing 
courts). 
 250. Id. (noting hurdles to statutory change in an era of “divided government”). 
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A. Niskanen and others generally critical of the administrative state. 
They focus on an agency claiming new or expanded turf, or regulating 
risks in a way more stringent or onerous than Congress allegedly 
intended in its statutory delegation.251 
But agencies abnegating previously claimed authority reveal 
another sort of power claim. An agency that deviates from 
congressional expectations through a regulatory withdrawal—whether 
by redefining its statutory powers or by relaxing implementation and 
enforcement (a common occurrence that is hard to challenge)—is also 
making a claim about the extent of its authority.252 
The wave of abnegation claims presented here, at a minimum, 
provides yet another substantial factual counterpoint to the oft-stated 
argument that agencies will overreach in the form of turf expansion 
and excess stringency. It also provides a counterpoint to the view that 
doctrine and regulatory infrastructure should be designed to check an 
allegedly pervasive agency tendency to overregulate.253 Political and 
economic incentives can lead agencies to act in a turf-shrinking 
direction while also asserting questionable statutory interpretations 
and violating administrative-law tenets about agency consistency. As 
such, any one-sided doctrinal “cures” or checks may actually 
exacerbate already prevalent problems of agency disregard for 
statutorily defined domains, as well as risks of agency lassitude and 
“torpor.”254 In addition, regulated parties and powerful interest groups 
will predictably seek to reduce regulatory burdens at every stage, from 
enabling legislation down to tailored planning, permits, requests for 
variances, or enforcement negotiations.255 If “slippage” and laxity are 
 
 251. See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT (1971) (positing the tendency of regulators to expand budgets through more 
regulation); ANDRE BLAIS & STEPHANE DION, THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT 4, 5 
(1991) (same). For other responses to these claims, see supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 252. Cf. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297–98 (2013) (rejecting calls for a distinction 
between ordinary review of agency action and review of “jurisdictional” claims due to the 
difficulty of drawing such a line, since all agency actions reflect a view of the agency’s power). 
 253. Much of the role of OIRA and the imposition of cost-benefit analysis, as well as 
regulatory-reform proposals and deregulatory orders, are rooted in such a claim of agency excess. 
See, e.g., supra Part II.A.1 (reviewing Trump deregulatory orders and memoranda, and claims 
about regulatory excess). 
 254. Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 30, at 86 (quoting Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2339–40 (2001) (discussing such risks)). 
 255. For review of such multilayered strategic efforts to weaken or escape regulatory 
strictures in the setting of a massive land-use highway project threatening a vulnerable fishery, 
see WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, FIGHTING WESTWAY: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, CITIZEN ACTIVISM, 
AND THE REGULATORY WAR THAT TRANSFORMED NEW YORK CITY 31–51 (2014). The book 
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a risk, as they are, regulatory-process choices and standards of review 
need to adjust for those risks as well.256 
B. Political-Economic Theory and Abnegation 
This Part now turns to analyzing the central mystery of statutory 
abnegation. Why would—really, why have—agencies found the 
statutory-abnegation strategy worth pursuing, despite its doctrinal 
disadvantages and the diminution in agency turf and policy discretion 
that it entails? As analyzed in the sections that follow, political and 
economic incentives make sense of abnegation, further illuminating its 
troubling legal implications. Legal actors, especially agencies and 
presidents, are not invariably disinterested agents faithfully hewing to 
legislative instructions; rather, they are entities responding to their own 
incentives in a dynamic, political, and interactive environment.257 Many 
incentives shaping agency actions are unrelated to what the law says or 
requires, but legal hurdles remain.258 This section’s analysis also reveals 
the inadequacies of political-accountability rationales often wielded in 
battles over the value of, and perils of, the administrative state. Of 
course, abnegation could include sound claims about the limits of 
agency authority; it is not necessarily or by definition illegal. However, 
agencies relying on abnegation claims have almost always also dodged 
procedural requirements that guarantee accountability and 
opportunities for public input, made little use of agency expertise, and 
provided little or no engagement with facts and the earlier action’s 
regulatory track record. They have offered little explanation other than 
summary linguistic analysis and virtually no close legal comparison of 
old and new views of agency authority.259 
When abnegating agencies focus only on statutory clarity or 
presidential edicts under a new administration, they are relying on two 
 
traces and analyzes the fourteen-year battle, the “art of regulatory war,” and how partisans fight 
strategically in multiple venues over time to achieve their goals and identify and seek to exploit 
regulatory vulnerabilities.  
 256. See Farber, supra note 241 (discussing agency “slippage” from delegated tasks). 
 257. Again, this view of agencies as acting in a sequential, interactive, political, and legally 
constrained environment with shifting and strategic incentives is a major difference between 
simple, more deterministic rational-actor theories of agency behavior, see, e.g., NISKANEN, supra 
note 251, and PPT assumptions. See also supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (citing works 
describing key elements of PPT); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article 
I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528–33 (1992) (analyzing legislative processes and how 
changes in the status quo and branch powers interrelate in dynamic ways). 
 258. See Wald, supra note 249, at 651. 
 259. See supra Part I.A (reviewing a sample of abnegation claims). 
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facets of regulatory political accountability. Such hierarchical 
obedience to the president and political appointees does not, however, 
logically or doctrinally excuse neglect of all of the other critically 
important sources of agency legitimacy, accountability, responsiveness, 
and clarity. These other neglected sources of political accountability 
remain crucial to the regulatory rule of law and, relatedly, reflect a 
“moral” commitment explaining many of the longstanding norms 
governing the administrative state.260 This section now analyzes why 
agencies and presidents may find abnegation rationales for regulatory 
rollbacks worthwhile, despite doctrinal disadvantages, legal infirmities, 
and normative concerns. 
1. A Long-Shot but Worthwhile Risk.  If one thinks of agency 
decisionmaking as not just about a particular regulatory intervention 
but as reflecting concern with, and also influencing, the agency’s future 
authority, abnegation may reflect an antiregulatory administration’s 
long-shot gamble for a long-term diminution in agency power and, 
concomitantly, an enduring deregulatory result. 
The agency actions discussed above involve, in a variety of forms 
and to different degrees, agencies’ assertions that they simply cannot 
regulate as before. Because a claim of no power is hard to justify under 
most statutes, and consistency doctrine requires agency policy shifts to 
be justified with much more engagement and explanation than actually 
undertaken by abnegating agencies, most 2017 and 2018 attempts at 
abnegation are legally vulnerable. But deregulation rooted in 
abnegation, whether ultimately rejected or successful, can provide both 
political and judicial benefits. Even an ultimate court defeat for 
abnegating agencies can offer political benefits, which are reviewed 
below. But the long-shot chance that courts will bless a power-limiting 
statutory interpretation is worth analyzing here. 
If an agency proffers a “no power” claim, it is making a potentially 
enduring assertion about its own authority and how the underlying 
statute must be construed in the future. If a court agrees, especially 
under a single-venue judicial-review statute or if later embraced by the 
 
 260. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1946–55 (2018) (discussing “rule of law” values, consistency doctrine, and 
reliance interests as forms of “morality” enforced by administrative law, even though some lack 
a grounding in any particular positive law). The essay builds off of fundamental legal virtues and 
needs identified earlier by Lon Fuller outside of the administrative state. Id. at 1925–26 (setting 
forth attributes of “law’s internal morality” identified in LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF 
LAW 38–44 (rev. ed. 1969)).  
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Supreme Court, then that abnegating statutory interpretation becomes 
permanent.261 The statute, and the agency’s power under it, would be 
permanently modified in a diminished form. And during an era of 
legislative gridlock, a congressional fix is especially unlikely. Even if 
the abnegation claim is of the more contingent “we can’t regulate in 
that way” sort, judicial agreement that an agency cannot use a 
particular regulatory tool or strategy would make some diminished 
authority permanent. Presidential or agency leadership seeking to 
weaken the regulatory scheme in the long term simply may view such 
claims as worth a shot, especially if one considers political benefits that 
may flow from such possibly successful rollbacks and the minimal 
personal costs associated with a judicial rejection.262 
2. Changing Policy-Change Doctrine.  The recent wave of agency 
statutory abnegation could also be a strategic prelude to arguments for 
doctrinal change regarding consistency doctrine and hard-look review 
in the deregulatory setting. No case now embraces a lesser standard of 
review for a deregulatory shift; in fact, the Supreme Court’s enduring, 
repeated demand is that agencies—whether engaged in initial 
regulation, deregulation, or a policy shift—must confront underlying 
facts, assess reliance interests, provide comparative legal reasoning of 
the old and new approaches, allow for and respond to critical 
comments, and leave no unexplained inconsistency.263 The Court has 
long demanded more explanation by agencies when changing policies 
than when an agency takes an initial action or simply declines to act.264 
As explained above, this body of law does not set a different or higher 
 
 261. If an agency’s actions are reviewable in numerous circuits, then the law will need to 
progress circuit by circuit, with potential intracircuit respect for precedent and intercircuit 
disagreement until Congress intervenes, the agency changes policy, or the Supreme Court 
resolves the statutory issue. For discussion of this law and possible linkages of abnegation-based 
deregulation in the Trump administration and 1980s litigation on agency nonacquiescence, see 
infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 262. John Graham, OIRA Administrator during the George W. Bush administration, 
identifies the modest personal costs associated with the usual judicial remand to agencies for 
failed actions, and possible political gains regardless of long-term success, as sometimes 
motivating agency policy choices. Email from John Graham, former OIRA Administrator, to 
author (Jan. 31, 2019, 15:15 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); email from John Graham, 
former OIRA Administrator, to author (Mar. 7, 2019, 11:07 EST) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal).  
 263. See supra notes 168–99 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court opinions 
rejecting impliedly lower standards for agency policy shifts and embracing rigorous, fact-driven 
analyses). 
 264. See supra notes 141–46, 170–75 (analyzing the Court’s commitment to “hard look” 
review). 
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standard of review but rather incorporates elements of hard-look 
review, requiring agencies to engage with all salient facts, address 
contested issues, and offer “good reasons” for a policy, be it new or a 
change. When an agency seeks to alter a preexisting policy, there is 
simply more that must be analyzed.265 
Agencies pursuing abnegation may hope to convince courts to 
create a new doctrinal carveout. Under this view, the argument is, or 
would be, that if the agency never had authority in the first instance, 
then the agency should be able to avoid the time and costs of 
undertaking legally unauthorized factual engagement and 
explanation.266 If the earlier claim of power was all overreach and 
illegal, then such analysis (under this view) has always been legally 
irrelevant. If the Supreme Court sees fit to devise a new, generally 
applicable framework that involves less rigorous agency obligations 
and less searching judicial review of deregulation by statutory 
abnegation, then the structural similarity of these many recent 
abnegation claims may make some sense. The numerosity of these 
claims perhaps reflects a goal of creating many opportunities to recast 
doctrine, whether through lower-court rulings or an increased 
probability of a case going to the Supreme Court. In proverbial terms, 
the administration and its deregulatory allies may be seeking many 
bites of the apple to test the abnegation rationale for deregulation.267 
As mentioned above, no case permits agencies to evade the 
discussion of facts and of harms resulting from deregulation. But most 
 
 265. See text accompanying supra note 259; see also supra note 153 (exploring the power of 
agency policy-shift justification obligations). 
 266. Cf. Ruhl and Robisch, supra note 236, at 102–03, 109–10 (identifying and criticizing 
agencies that claim a lack of discretion in order to avoid hard and political costly work, and 
characterizing such avoidance as “discretion aversion”). 
 267. This rash of unreasoned regulatory shifts and their common abnegation rationale could 
share attributes with the Reagan administration’s pursuit of both changing Social Security policy 
and testing the executive branch’s latitude to nonacquiesce in court rulings, even when acting in 
a circuit with established contrary precedent. See William W. Buzbee, Administrative Agency 
Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 582–84 (1985) (identifying this practice and 
reasons it was problematic but acknowledging the difference between intra- and intercircuit 
nonacquiescence); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal 
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 735–51 (1989) (analyzing the practice and identifying 
settings where it could be justified or should be condemned). For a rejoinder to Estreicher and 
Revesz, see Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown 
of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 802–03 (1990) 
(critiquing Estreicher and Revesz’s assumptions and proposed approach to nonacquiescence). 
The Trump administration may similarly be willing to test its theories and lose, hoping for some 
wins on the underlying statutory issues or a larger win that reshapes how courts review 
deregulatory policy shifts. 
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instances of abnegation have involved courts that disagreed with the 
agency’s statutory claim of no power, so we do not know if judicial 
acceptance of a particular abnegation claim might also lead such a 
court to accept or endorse a fast-tracked agency action that neglects 
comparative legal and factual analysis. Although some courts might be 
sympathetic to agencies short-circuiting their usual consistency-
doctrine analytical obligations when a persuasive abnegation claim is 
made, close analysis of abnegation-based actions and the logic of 
deference regimes cuts against the legality of any such short-
circuiting.268 Nonetheless, because doctrinal adjustments smoothing 
the path for deregulation by statutory abnegation would be of enduring 
value for all deregulatory and antiregulatory agencies and advocates, 
fighting for such a doctrinal change might be viewed as worth the price 
of many losses. 
3. Political and Career Regulator Tensions.  Another explanation 
for statutory abnegation and related procedural deficiencies is the 
tension or distrust between political appointees and career officials. 
Due to their years of service for politically diverse leaders, career 
officials will usually know how to identify the weaknesses of an agency 
action and reduce the risk of judicial reversal. Internal distrust, 
however, can lead political appointees working as change agents to 
shirk the usual forms of sequential vetting by career experts in pursuing 
legal change.269 News stories and some internal agency investigations 
 
 268. See infra Part III.E (exploring why even a broad agency claim of having “no power 
whatsoever” should still be accompanied by the comparative analysis called for by consistency 
doctrine). 
 269. News stories indicate that early Trump-administration deregulatory actions were 
championed by temporary “beachhead teams” that often were drawn from law firms and 
industrial associations. See, e.g., Annie Waldman, Former Lobbyist With For-Profit Colleges Quits 
Education Department, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 21, 2017, 10:44 AM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/former-lobbyist-with-for-profit-colleges-quits-education-department [https://perma.cc/
CFE7-H2QV]. Such actions were reportedly not vetted by career agency professionals (whether 
civil servant or Senior Executive Service personnel), perhaps explaining some of their 
overreaching and legal infirmities. See infra note 270 (reviewing such a clash). Similar strategies 
and resulting flaws plagued the Reagan administration during its deregulatory efforts. See 
GOLDEN, supra note 241, at 45–47 (describing how major change was “‘sent down’” by political 
appointees pushing deregulation rather than “percolating up” through the agency, as “was 
customary for agency policy”). She also found other tensions between political and career 
officials; although there was a wide array of responses, few career officials sought to sabotage the 
politically led deregulation. Id. at 44–60. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE FIFTH RISK (2018) 
(exploring protective roles and innovations prompted by federal agencies, repeatedly recounting 
Trump-administration “beachhead teams” and inexperienced political appointees arriving at 
agencies without understanding the agencies’ tasks, divisions, or roles played by knowledgeable 
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have revealed that agencies in the Trump administration pursued hasty 
policy changes due to the advocacy of “beachhead teams” drawn from 
affected industries and lobbying organizations, sometimes without the 
involvement of career officials.270 News stories also recount similar 
tensions between political appointees and career employees within the 
Department of Justice, the litigator for federal agencies.271 Similar 
interactions were found in a study of Reagan-era deregulatory 
efforts.272 
Relatedly, regulatory incentives will vary for political and career 
officials, potentially leading to reasoning gaps and other lapses by 
agencies. Politically accountable agency leadership will unsurprisingly 
focus upon electoral pressures and presidential preferences, with 
shorter-term advantages or obedience to the president looming large. 
Legislators will have an institutional interest in statutes’ ongoing 
effectiveness, but in reality may be long gone from the political scene 
 
career officials, and resulting risks and mistakes); see also Barbash & Paul, supra note 43 (quoting 
former EPA regulator and Republican lawyer Jeffrey Holmstead about the lack of Trump 
leadership “experience” and “the Trump team’s ‘complete distrust of the career staff’ at EPA, . . . 
a professional corps that ‘always gives you good advice, whether or not they agree’ with the 
president’s politics”). 
 270. See, e.g., Office of the Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, 
Review of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Cancellation of Marketplace 
Enrollment Outreach Efforts (OEI-12-17-00290) (2017) (linked to Press Release, Senator Patty 
Murray, Government Watch Dog Investigation, Requested by Senator Murray, Confirms Trump 
Administration Sabotaged Open Enrollment Without Any Analysis of Impacts on Patients & 
Families (Oct. 25, 2017)) (noting that the “beachhead team” cancelled plans for open enrollment 
despite career officials’ preparation and monetary commitments for publicity). Similar failures of 
coordination between career and political officials appear to explain the failure of Department of 
Homeland Security even to acknowledge a change in policy and a new statutory-abnegation claim 
regarding the return of émigrés in the United States under TPS. See supra notes 44–48 (discussing 
these actions). Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1089–98 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting 
injunction, reviewing APA claims, and the policy change and the agency’s failure to disclose and 
explain it); Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (denying motions to 
dismiss and, after tracking policy changes and tensions between career and political appointees’ 
views, explaining why agency policy shifts without explanation and justification violate APA 
requirements).  
 271. See Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Rank-and-File Tell of Discontent Over Session’s 
Approach, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/jeff-
sessions-justice-department.html [https://perma.cc/7GUS-NYGK] (discussing the results of 
political leaders ignoring dissent and advice of career attorneys).  
 272. GOLDEN, supra note 241, at 44–60 (discussing tensions between political and career 
officials and how they contributed to inadequately explained changes in seatbelt and airbag 
regulation leading to the State Farm case); id. at 109–50 (describing stark differences in career and 
political leadership’s interactions at the Reagan administration’s EPA, and how periods of tension 
led to clashes and even “strong resistance, even guerilla warfare,” but also finding tension due to 
political leaders’ delay, “footdragging,” and avoidance of “checks” created under the APA).  
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when an agency seeks to shuck off some previously understood 
authority, settled policy, or task.273 Career agency lawyers and staff, in 
contrast, will often focus on longstanding agency practices, policy 
goals, and long-term concerns about agency power and discretion, and 
they will presumptively act in accordance with legislative, evidentiary, 
and judicial constraints requiring technocratic and reasoned 
decisionmaking.274 Career officials (whether civil servants or Senior 
Executive Service) may also, due to their career choices and history of 
work within an agency, feel a stronger dedication to the overall mission 
of the agency, while political appointees pushing for deregulation may 
overtly seek to dismantle the agency’s law and regulations.275 Due to 
this clash, unreasoned or flawed regulatory changes may emerge.276 
One analysis of the Reagan administration’s deregulatory efforts, 
however, found only rare evidence of career employees intentionally 
undercutting a new administration’s policy changes.277 
 
 273. Judge Wald describes this reality as common. Wald, supra note 249, at 651–52, 655.  
 274. See GOLDEN, supra note 241, at 151–66 (finding differences in agencies’ cultures and 
interactions of career and political appointees).  
 275. Id.; see also infra notes 269–71 and accompanying text (discussing career-political 
tensions and resulting problems); Benner, supra note 271 (describing such clashes at the 
Department of Justice).  
 276. Although not identified in the deregulation literature, a form of “work-to-rule” protest 
could also explain the legal inadequacies of the wave of deregulatory abnegation actions. If 
political leaders insist on hastily issuing a policy change, career personnel could capitulate to their 
hierarchical superiors and let the action become public without fighting for improvement. Cf. 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. Rev. 809, 818–19 
(2015) (identifying extreme forms of obedience to rules as a means of protest, including “working-
to-rule” strategies in labor law). In a possible example of capitulation as protest, the Army Corps 
of Engineers reversed itself on a permit decision with no explanation other than obedience to the 
president’s “direction” after a presidential memorandum seeking such action. See Buzbee, The 
Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1389. A court similarly found federal agencies’ new Keystone 
Pipeline environmental-impact analysis following a presidential directive to be shoddy and 
inadequately explained, given the requirements of consistency doctrine. See Indigenous Envtl. 
Network v. U.S. Dep’t. of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 582–84 (D. Mont. 2018) (identifying 
inconsistencies and stating that agencies cannot “ignore inconvenient facts” (citation omitted)). 
Despite the ruling and subsequent injunction, id. at 591, President Trump later withdrew his 
earlier memorandum, “revoked” the earlier permit that had been judicially invalidated, and 
purported to issue a direct “Presidential Permit.” Presidential Permit of March 29, 2019, 
Authorizing TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., To Construct, Connect, Operate, and 
Maintain Pipeline Facilities at the International Boundary Between the United States and 
Canada, 84 Fed. Reg. 13,101 (Apr. 3, 2019). This further policy change and permit reversal relied 
only on “the authority vested in” the president, cited no statutory authority, and neither included 
nor referenced any legal explanation or analysis of effects previously ruled to be required by a 
federal judge. Id. at 13,101. 
 277. See GOLDEN, supra note 241, at 109–50 (pulling together insights from agency-specific 
chapters about reasons for sloppy or unsuccessful policy shifts, and finding only rare examples of 
career efforts to undercut an administration’s new policy directions); see also supra notes 269–71 
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4. Political Benefits Even if Vulnerable to Judicial Rejection.  
Perhaps the best explanation for these many disavowals of agency 
power is also the most troubling from the perspectives of the rule of 
law, legislative supremacy, and political accountability—rationales that 
underlie the legitimacy of the administrative state. Disavowals of 
agency power and the regulatory rollbacks that accompany them can, 
and indeed are likely to, generate political benefits wholly unrelated to 
their legal merits. In fact, an agency’s embrace of rollbacks and the 
diminution of its power may be of maximum political benefit where the 
agency and presidential administration can reject the choices of 
previous presidents and agency leaders. And if they can loudly and 
repeatedly claim that a past administration’s work was egregiously 
illegal, as claimed by abnegating agencies, that may be even better 
politics. Agencies and presidents may also see benefits in publicly 
rejecting the legislative work of a past Congress. Such regulatory 
opposition by a president and from within an agency, even if contrary 
to law, may appeal to a political party’s base or perhaps an electorally 
important region.278 Legal disruption may not be a mistake or reflect 
imprudence; it may be precisely the political goal. Agency statutory 
abnegation hence could be a form of political speech, totally apart from 
its legal merits.279 If so, regulatory integrity and compliance with 
governing statutes may be of little or no importance. Political coalitions 
supporting a president, agency leadership, or a political party may see 
abrupt deregulatory relief and accompanying rhetoric as the delivery 
on political promises, even if illegal under governing law and lacking a 
supportive factual basis. 
Further, targeted regulatory rollbacks can provide unusually 
focused and tangible political and business benefits to industry actors, 
akin to variances and exemptions from otherwise uniform and broadly 
 
(citing additional sources regarding career-political official tensions and resulting flawed agency 
actions). 
 278. The many Trump-administration regulatory rollbacks aimed at Midwestern and 
Appalachian mining and oil-and-gas businesses have been broadly viewed, and even claimed, as 
meant to benefit those regions and, in particular, coal interests. See Friedman, supra note 237 
(reviewing the proposed rule’s effects, statements of President Trump about helping coal country, 
and other coal-linked rollbacks); see also Emails of John Graham to author, supra note 262 
(identifying political motivations and benefits even for legally vulnerable regulatory shifts). 
 279. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005) 
(exploring government decisions as a form of dissent and political speech, especially in the 
federalism arena); cf. Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
1995, 2014–25 (2018) (discussing state legislatures taking away local governments’ powers and 
questioning the wisdom and legality of states punishing local officials for their statements and 
votes). 
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imposed regulatory obligations.280 Even if the policy shift is eventually 
rejected in the courts, agencies and presidents pursuing an overt and 
vocal statutory-abnegation strategy still get to reveal their loyalties. 
The very political responsiveness that abnegation manifests thus can 
be—and often has been during 2017 and 2018—linked not to some 
nuanced dispute over the best policy or statutory interpretation but, 
when examined in overall context, to agencies’ direct and overt 
opposition to governing laws and regulations that presidents and 
agencies are nonetheless constitutionally obligated to “take care” to 
“faithfully execute[].”281 Notably, none of the abnegation actions 
reviewed above involve agencies expanding on or adjusting means to 
achieve the protective goals behind (and usually stated within) statutes. 
Across the board, these actions reflect a goal of reducing burdens on 
businesses. 
Because federal laws, by their very nature, tend to set national 
goals and require uniform applicability, agencies and presidents 
delivering promises of regulatory relaxation for particular sectors, 
regions, or political supporters will often be acting in a legally suspect 
manner.282 Statutes rarely permit consideration of such criteria. Thus, 
deregulatory rollouts and accompanying political events have 
sometimes made the intended beneficiaries clear; the actual regulatory 
 
 280. AARON L. NIELSON, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., WAIVERS, EXEMPTIONS, AND 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: AN EXAMINATION OF AGENCY NONENFORCEMENT PRACTICES 
11–25 (2017) (reviewing cases on nonenforcement unreviewability and scholarship); id. at 24–25, 
60 (identifying concerns with nonenforcement and the risk an agency could “nullify a valid act of 
Congress,” act for “insiders” or with bias, and do so without transparency); Alfred C. Aman Jr., 
Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 
323–28 (analyzing capture concerns with the use of regulatory exceptions, but also identifying 
benefits of regulatory tailoring and flexibility); see also Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception 
Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an 
Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 263–300 (analyzing an exceptions process but identifying 
extensive risks, mainly power accretion and loss of political accountability). 
 281. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. For discussion of this clause and its centrality to tensions over 
the role of the administrative state and clashes between congressional choices and presidential 
priorities, see Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 30, at 88–91. 
 282. Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN AND WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, OR 
HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-
SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981) (analyzing how a 
Clean Air Act provision tilted regulatory choices to protect high-sulphur coal producers). Most 
environmental and risk-regulation laws, however, call for nationally uniform standards without 
criteria that reflect explicit or veiled regional favoritism. However, courts have allowed regionally 
focused action in the enforcement-remedy setting when rational and not prohibited. E.g., Ctr. for 
Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–17 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 452 F.3d 
798 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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documents, in contrast, have used language with little or no attention 
to distributional or political consequences.283  
Furthermore, targets of regulation will often gain financially from 
the delay between a president’s deregulatory directions, agency 
abnegation claims, and eventual resolution in the courts.284 The time 
required by this process will often accomplish a temporary, de facto 
regulatory rollback. At a minimum, when agencies signal a shift in a 
deregulatory direction, they will often stifle any momentum for more 
rigorous or burdensome regulation. Business or technological shifts 
and new business competition that might have justified further 
regulatory rigor are also likely to be undercut with political signals that 
regulatory demands for improved products or performance are 
unlikely.285 And even if old regulations remain in force in the interim, 
every brief filed and case appealed provides another press-worthy 
declaration of political and regulatory priorities and loyalties.286 
Paradoxically, one of the central tenets of skepticism about the 
regulatory state and regulatory excess—that agencies are insensitive to 
the economic burdens of regulation—can partly explain agencies’ 
many (likely fruitless) attempts at abnegation.287 Because 
administrative officials are personally insensitive to squandered 
resources, they may see repeated failed regulatory rollbacks as 
nonetheless a victory due to related political benefits. They are unlikely 
to personally pay for failed rollbacks, litigation expenses, wasted 
agency resources, or harms befalling those left unprotected due to 
 
 283. See text accompanying supra note 274 (discussing coal-protective deregulation and overt 
regionally focused appeals by the administration and supporters). The ACE proposed-rule notice 
does not have a regional focus and rarely even mentions coal. See supra notes 76–79 (discussing 
the genesis and substance of this proposed rule, and past regulation and delays). In contrast, coal-
focused benefits have been an overt part of accompanying politics. Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. Will 
Ease Path for New Coal Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2018, at B3 (describing and quoting 
stakeholders about coal-targeted benefits); Press Release, White House, WTAS: Support for 
Trump Administration’s Proposal to Replace the Costly and Overreaching Clean Power Plan 
(Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/wtas-support-trump-
administrations-proposal-replace-costly-overreaching-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/SBL3-
X9XG] (containing four pages of quotes from politicians and interest groups supporting the 
rollback and claiming Obama-administration overreach and benefits for the coal industry).  
 284. See Blais & Wagner, supra note 241, at 1711–15 (discussing benefits of delay for 
regulatory targets, and citing supportive sources).  
 285. See Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, supra note 58, at 1051–57, 1081–92 (discussing linkage 
of regulation and regulatory reversal risks, “federalism hedging,” and development of products 
and practices to meet regulation-assisted demand). 
 286. See Emails of John Graham to author, supra note 262 (identifying political motivations 
and benefits even if a policy action is unlikely to succeed in court). 
 287. Id.  
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regulatory stasis or policy reversals.288 Such costs of failed deregulation 
remain off the agency’s ledger, apart from the work involved with new 
action following a judicial remand. Legal requirements may ultimately 
be enforced, but the incentives created by the political and fiscal costs 
and rewards may nonetheless drive more failed deregulatory efforts. 
C. Abnegation, Politicized Regulation, and Political Accountability’s 
Forms 
Agencies justifying deregulation with statutory abnegation have 
generally offered little in the way of explanation or scale-tipping 
rationales, tending instead to make conclusory claims about past excess 
and circumscribed statutory authority. Some abnegating agencies cite 
presidential executive orders in tandem with the partial dissent of 
Justice Rehnquist in State Farm and a sentence in Fox, both of which 
acknowledge that a new president can legitimately push for a change 
in regulatory priorities.289 Presidential involvement is presented as a 
“plus,” if not implicitly viewed or presented as a decisive factor to 
justify these regulatory rollbacks. This section analyzes forms of 
political involvement and accountability and the statutory-abnegation 
strategy, arguing that judicial resistance to this strategy is appropriate. 
If one links the presidential-involvement rationale for statutory 
abnegation to unitary-executive theorists’ views of the administrative 
state—and deregulatory statements by President Trump and agency 
heads echo such sentiments290—then a more fully fleshed-out argument 
for abnegation appears inchoate, even if ultimately unpersuasive. That 
is, agencies are deregulating consistent with the elected president’s 
political preferences, and such vertical, hierarchical accountability and 
respect for presidential wishes make the president directly and overtly 
accountable for the regulatory shift. And, so the argument goes, this 
direct alignment of agency and presidential views heightens the 
constitutional legitimacy of agency action. Justice Kagan’s scholarship, 
when she was a professor, offered a somewhat consistent view. She 
argued that presidents should have presumptive authority to be 
involved in agency decisionmaking if not statutorily prohibited; 
 
 288. Id. (identifying the minimal costs of failed policy actions to agency and agency leadership 
as a reason vulnerable actions may be pursued, and also noting the political benefits of playing to 
constituents). 
 289. See supra notes 149, 155, 166–67, 176–84 and accompanying text (presenting and 
discussing agency reference to some of this language and State Farm). 
 290. See supra Parts I.A and I.B (presenting deregulatory proposals and accompanying 
rationales and politics). 
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however, she did not argue that presidential involvement creates a 
proagency presumption.291 Justice Kavanaugh’s lengthy concurrence 
about political accountability and the place of independent agencies in 
In re Aiken County292 (written when he was still an appellate judge) is 
similar but goes further.293 He constructs a president-centric theory of 
“political accountability” and argues that presidential agency 
leadership and the power to fire agency officials at will is a 
constitutionally required feature of the administrative state.294 Much of 
that dissent builds on broad language in the far narrower context of 
layered for-cause protections from dismissal addressed in Free 
Enterprise.295 
Before questioning the adequacy of such hierarchical, president-
focused accountability rationales, one caveat is necessary. A 
president’s ability to nudge agencies to consider an action that would 
further a president’s priorities, or to involve the White House in 
regulatory deliberations if not prohibited by statute, are both generally 
acceptable and even run-of-the-mill interactions.296 In addition, 
presidents have the constitutionally rooted power to seek agency 
reports.297 Similarly, both executive-agency heads and independent-
agency appointments will unsurprisingly involve political 
considerations.298 Thus, any legal infirmities and normative concerns 
with agency abnegation claims should not rest on the mere reality of 
the president’s broad powers and usual efforts to nudge agencies in 
preferred policy directions. 
Instead, the point is that although presidents are routinely 
involved in agency appointments and regulatory decisions, that reality 
 
 291. Kagan, supra note 254. 
 292. In re Aiken County, 645 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 293. Id. at 438–48 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 294. See id. In closing, Judge Kavanaugh softens his argument in light of precedent, but he 
nonetheless repeatedly argues that the president’s constitutional position logically should include 
the unfettered power to dismiss executive-branch officials. Id. 
 295. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492–514 (2010). 
 296. See Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1427–29 (identifying such 
leadership nudges as legitimate and ordinary). 
 297. Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization—PCAOB in the Footsteps of 
Myers, Humprey’s Executor, Morrison, and Freytag, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2258 (2011) 
[hereinafter Strauss, Difficulties of Generalization] (discussing the president’s constitutionally 
rooted right to seek opinions in writing from executive-branch officials). 
 298. Id. (discussing tensions between presidential authority and congressional choices about 
agency design and regulatory goals). 
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does not provide cover for violations of other legal edicts.299 
Presidential involvement cannot excuse failures to act in accordance 
with the politically accountable modes required by statutory and 
regulatory law, along with centuries of administrative-law doctrine.300 
More than presidential electoral accountability matters to the legality 
of agency actions and policy changes.301 These intertwined bodies of 
doctrine emphasize legislative supremacy and the need for agencies, 
presidents, and courts to respect and enforce the substantive and 
procedural choices of Congress.302 Presidents and politics can often 
work to influence an agency choice, but only within the confines of 
what Congress provides or delegates for agency discretion.303 As 
developed more in the following discussion, political accountability as 
a cross-doctrine value does not, upon closer analysis, do much to 
advance the argument for statutory abnegation rooted in presidential 
political predilections. 
The first and most essential element of agency political 
accountability is rooted in legislative supremacy. Congress sets policy 
under its conferred powers and, through an express constitutional 
grant, can fashion laws as “Necessary and Proper” to fulfill this role 
and make government work to achieve its policy goals.304 In thousands 
 
 299. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 750–53 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”?] 
(distinguishing between the president’s usual ability to oversee agencies and questionable efforts 
to supplant the delegated agency with presidential decisions). 
 300. For arguments about the need for presidents to respect congressional choices, see Kevin 
M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Power to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 284 
(2006) (documenting a variety of statutory choices about agency and presidential power, and 
arguing for respect for such varied choices); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 965, 977–79 (1997) (same, with a focus on the different forms of political control 
over agencies due to congressional and constitutional choices).  
 301. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
761 (2007) (discussing cases where courts review agency actions with a focus on whether the 
agency exercised its authority “in a democratic fashion”). 
 302. Strauss, Difficulties of Generalization, supra note 297, at 2275 (emphasizing the 
president’s obligation to respect the placement of power in agencies subject to statutorily set 
criteria and procedure). 
 303. For additional analysis of settings and degrees of presidential control, see Buzbee, The 
Tethered President, supra note 10 at 1427–41, and supra notes 269–77 and accompanying text 
(citing and discussing career and political official tensions and how they can influence agency 
actions). 
 304. See John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1046–58 (2014) 
(providing a historical perspective on such clauses and the powers they conferred); see also Gillian 
E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607, 1639 
(2015) (citing John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of 
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2014)) (questioning the Supreme Court’s 
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of laws, Congress has stated policy priorities, designated the 
responsible regulatory actors, set forth the process through which 
agencies act, and provided criteria to guide each agency’s 
multitudinous regulatory tasks.305 All agency actions need to conform 
to these congressional choices. And, conversely, agencies cannot 
decline their roles, ignore required process, or base their decisions on 
factors outside the law.306 Even if a president becomes involved in an 
agency action, the action’s legality is still assessed for conformity with 
congressional choices.307 And courts, too, are not to second guess the 
goals and means chosen by Congress.308 Those are choices for 
Congress, although enforced by the courts. 
Furthermore, that the president holds executive authority 
conferred by the Constitution does not mean that authority is 
unfettered. Under the Constitution, the president must also “take 
care” that the law of the land is “faithfully executed.”309 As mandated 
in Massachusetts v. EPA and dozens of other Supreme Court and 
lower-court decisions before and after, agencies and presidents cannot 
toss aside regulatory tasks assigned by Congress based on factors 
outside the relevant statute.310 As the Supreme Court stated in City of 
Arlington,311 agencies’ “power to act and how they are to act is 
authoritatively prescribed by Congress, so when they act improperly, 
no less than when they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is 
ultra vires.”312 Similarly, in the recent, unanimous Weyerhaeuser313 
 
resistance to innovation and lack of deference to how Congress allocates authority to agencies 
due to the Necessary and Proper Clause’s “textual assignment” of this power to Congress). 
 305. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
462–63 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing agency accountability and how congressional choices shape what 
agencies can do).  
 306. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA and consistency-doctrine cases 
establishing substantive and procedural statutory prerequisites for agency policy change, some of 
which involved abnegation claims). 
 307. See Seidenfeld, supra note 21 (acknowledging politics in regulation but arguing that 
judicial review must focus on the agency action for conformity with the law, as evidenced by the 
agency’s stated justifications and explication of tradeoffs). 
 308. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1978) (enforcing the mandates of the 
Endangered Species Act and explaining the need for courts to respect congressional choices). 
 309. See generally Stack, supra note 300 (discussing the roots of presidential obligations to 
respect congressional choices); Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”?, supra note 299 (same). 
 310. For discussion of Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), see supra notes 32–41 and 
accompanying text. 
 311. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013). 
 312. Id. at 297–98. 
 313. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018). 
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decision, the Court affirmed the “familiar” principle that agencies must 
“consider all of the relevant factors that the statute sets forth to guide 
the agency in the exercise of its discretion.”314 
Relatedly, the APA’s presumptively applicable procedural modes 
and framework for judicial review also reflect an enduring 
congressional commitment to the regularity of agency procedure and a 
mandate for agencies to explain and justify their choices.315 The courts’ 
longstanding requirement of “reasoned decisionmaking” and, in 
reviewing recent abnegation actions, enforcement of APA mandates 
reify those commitments. This body of doctrine is now a hybrid of 
statutory interpretation and administrative common law, reflecting a 
“morality” of administrative law with deep roots in rule-of-law 
aspirations.316 
Moreover, despite the breadth of agencies’ conferred powers, 
judicial review of agency actions has long been viewed as essential for 
agency legitimacy and as an important element underpinning judicial 
acceptance of broad delegations of power to agencies.317 Courts insist 
that agency actions rise and fall based on the justification provided 
contemporaneously with the action.318 Agency actions, even if possibly 
acceptable in result, will be rejected if not adequately explained or 
justified, a requirement that enables courts to fulfill their reviewing 
function.319 And that judicial function is contingent on agencies acting 
through participatory and transparent processes and in conformity 
with substantive and procedural requirements. As noted in Sierra Club 
 
 314. Id. at 371. 
 315. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (stating courts should not 
have to “speculate on reasons that might support an agency’s decision”). Section 559 of the APA, 
by making its requirements presumptively applicable and requiring express contrary indications 
by Congress before agencies can ignore the APA, reflects Congress’s enduring embrace of the 
reasoned decisionmaking of agencies and robust judicial review. Courts rigorously enforce these 
requirements. Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1403–07 (reviewing “reasoned 
decisionmaking” doctrine and its importance to review of deregulatory rollbacks). 
 316. See Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, supra note 24, at 1359–70 
(discussing administrative law’s development in a common law–like manner); Sunstein & 
Vermeule, supra note 260, at 1947–55 (discussing “rule of law” values, consistency doctrine, and 
reliance interests as forms of “morality” enforced by administrative law). 
 317. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 305, at 860 (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, 
Delegation and Judicial Review, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (2010) and David S. Tatel, The 
Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) 
for this proposition).  
 318. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 89–90 (1943) (discussing the standard for 
determining what is fair and equitable). 
 319. Id. at 93–95. 
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v. Costle,320 regulation is in part a political process that leaves room for 
some unrecorded and informal communications within and among the 
branches.321 Were mere presidential prodding or pressure all that was 
needed to explain an agency action, however, these other checks to 
ensure legality and rationality would be weakened.322 
Lastly, Congress creates agencies in a remarkable array of forms. 
Agency abnegation due to obeisance to a president’s preferences or 
edicts will often run afoul of congressional choices. Among the 
variables reflected in those agency forms are nuanced differences in the 
criteria agencies are to weigh and the procedures through which they 
must act. The more a president could influence an agency choice with 
nonstatutory mandates or mere off-the-record nudges, the more that 
agency action could stray from congressionally reticulated mandates.323 
When Congress imposes on agencies specific tasks, criteria, and 
procedures, the room for politically driven agency action dwindles.324 
Furthermore, Congress often chooses to create and harness 
independent agencies, with their usual stable but rotating 
multimember commission structure and protections against dismissal 
without cause. When it does so, Congress has chosen to add even more 
agency insulation from the oscillating political whims of presidential 
administrations.325 This could reflect a congressional preference for 
legal stability, for technocratic or science-based decisionmaking, or for 
policy moderation less buffeted by partisan rancor.326 
 
 320. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 321. Id. at , 405–08. 
 322. See Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?, supra note 299, at 713 (quoting EDWARD S. 
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1957, at 80–81 (4th rev. ed. 1957)) 
(questioning the constitutionality of presidents claiming broad power to displace congressional 
choices). 
 323. Unrecorded influence in politicized notice-and-comment rulemakings is allowed, Sierra 
Club, 657 F.2d  at 406–08, but the agency action still must be justified under the law and the agency 
record. See also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Pwr. Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978) (prohibiting judicial imposition of process not required by statutes or agency regulations, 
but emphasizing that review for substantive justification remains); Seidenfeld, supra note 21, at 
151 (emphasizing the need for judicial review to focus on agency justifications while 
acknowledging the ubiquity of political influence). 
 324. See infra Part III.D (discussing cases rejecting abnegation-based policy shifts and noting 
courts’ careful parsing of the APA and enabling acts for their procedural requirements and 
governing substantive criteria). 
 325. See MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 385–96 (2015) (discussing recent resistance to the role of independent agencies and 
addressing countervailing arguments). See generally id. (discussing the logic behind and forms of 
independent agencies). 
 326. See generally id. (discussing historical goals of expertise and insulation in the context of 
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D. Judicial Enforcement of the Agency Obligation to Engage 
Massachusetts v. EPA and an early wave of judicial rejections of 
Trump-administration deregulatory actions reveal that courts apply no 
different or easier judicial review merely because an agency asserts a 
statutory-abnegation claim. Courts take seriously the requirement that 
agencies conform their conduct to requirements of their enabling acts, 
the APA, and the body of law collectively described here as 
consistency doctrine. Courts require agencies to fully engage with their 
governing law and underlying regulatory contingencies, and to leave 
no “unexplained inconsistency.”327 This includes a judicial requirement 
that agencies explain changes in the agency’s view of its power and the 
effects of such a change. The crosscutting theme of these decisions is 
that reasoned decisionmaking is essential for agencies to respect 
congressional mandates, to preserve agency legitimacy, and to allow 
courts to fulfill their role as monitors of agency actions.328 Political 
accountability in all of its forms remains a strong requirement enforced 
by the courts. 
For example, as reviewed earlier, when the Bush administration’s 
EPA tried to justify inaction on climate change with reference to 
presidential priorities and foreign-policy repercussions—as well as 
abnegation claims rooted in textual analysis, “major questions” 
precedents, and the claimed need for clearer authorization—the 
Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA resoundingly rejected EPA’s 
arguments.329 The Court focused on the statute’s broad language, the 
lack of statutory grounding for EPA’s rationales for inaction, and the 
fact that the agency had not yet engaged with the science relevant to 
the Clean Air Act’s requirements. Both in its discussion of standing 
and its overall construction of the statute, the Court mandated that the 
agency undertake whatever actions Congress had required based on 
the statutory criteria, even if regulation would represent only an 
incremental step toward a larger goal.330 The agency’s “reasons for 
 
major precedents). 
 327. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing cases articulating the requirements of consistency 
doctrine for agencies seeking to make a policy change). 
 328. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Encino Motorcars explicitly linked the agency 
obligation to engage in “reasoned decisionmaking” to the more particular variables agencies must 
address when making a policy change. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–
27 (2016). 
 329. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–35 (2007); see also supra notes 40–41 and 
accompanying text (introducing the significance of Massachusetts v. EPA). 
 330. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533 (noting the statutory limits on EPA’s 
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action or inaction must conform to the authorizing statute,” the Court 
declared.331 It rejected EPA’s declination to act based on a “laundry 
list” of nonstatutory considerations.332 
Appellate and district courts ruling on the first wave of Trump-
administration deregulatory actions have used similar language and 
reached similar conclusions. Many of these rulings involved agency 
efforts to abandon or delay regulations promulgated late in the Obama 
administration. In doing so, agencies often argued for a delay or stay, 
promised some return to an alleged status quo, or indicated that future 
policy change was likely.333 As shown in Part I’s survey of abnegation 
claims, most such deregulatory actions involved agency claims that the 
past administration exceeded its statutory powers, although in some 
actions agencies parroted industry’s empirical claims of overregulation 
or doubts about the efficacy of the earlier regulatory strategy.334 And, 
as discussed above, most of these delay or stay actions, like abnegation 
claims more generally, have involved little or no accompanying 
engagement with past reasoning and underlying facts and science 
previously viewed as central. 
Several courts rejected the Trump administration’s abnegation-
based abandonment of DACA—the Obama administration’s policy of 
immigration forbearance for “Dreamers”—with the opinions 
substantially tracking one another’s logic.335 Two courts found legal 
error, inadequate explanation, and a violation of consistency doctrine 
in DHS’s failure to engage with earlier factual considerations and legal 
views.336A third decision did not itself determine the lawfulness of 
 
discretion); id. at 52–25 (stating that “[a]gencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive 
problems in one fell regulatory swoop” but “whittle away at them over time,” and discussing a 
standing remedy as shaped by analysis of “whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce 
it” (emphasis added)). 
 331. Id. at 533. 
 332. Id. 
 333. See Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1376–90 (reviewing a wide array 
of Trump deregulatory actions); Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays, supra note 209, at 16–47 
(analyzing early Trump-administration stay-and-delay actions and judicial rejections). 
 334. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wheeler, 899 F.3d 814, 820–21, 829 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (rejecting EPA’s reversal of a proposed revocation of regulation of chlorpyrifos due to 
the claim that “science . . . remains unresolved,” in light of EPA violating express statutory 
criteria and deadlines and failing to respond to submitted objections or explain changed agency 
views about associated risks). 
 335. The DACA policy and its reversal is introduced in supra notes 49–55 and accompanying 
text. 
 336. See Vidal v. Nielsen 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 420–22 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding the DACA 
reversal was rooted in legal error); id. at 427–33 (finding the agency committed factual errors, 
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DACA but declined to enjoin the rescission due to a finding that the 
rescission was based on a “legitimate belief” in its lawfulness and 
agency concerns with litigation; notably, that opinion also did not 
discuss consistency-doctrine precedents.337 
A fourth DACA decision found the agency’s legal justification too 
lacking in any actual explanation to be worthy of affirmation.338 The 
judge gave DHS an opportunity to offer a more fulsome legal rationale 
before imposing a national injunction but, upon a later review, still 
found the rescission inadequately justified.339 This court was concerned 
with the diminished accountability of policy changes rooted in 
unexplained abnegation, even in the setting of enforcement choices 
where agencies generally wield broad discretion: “When an official 
claims that the law requires her to exercise her enforcement authority 
in a certain way, however, she excuses herself from this 
accountability.”340 The court concluded that “an official cannot claim 
that the law ties her hands while at the same time denying the courts’ 
power to unbind her. She may escape political accountability or judicial 
review, but not both.”341 The court hence refused to accept the validity 
of the DACA rescission, on the basis that it was rooted in what were 
either erroneous or inadequately explained legal views. 
The series of regulatory proposals and actions to revise or 
abandon the Clean Water Rule have similarly relied in part on 
statutory abnegation, with EPA and the Army Corps under the Trump 
administration claiming that the Obama administration’s Clean Water 
 
failed to offer logical legal reasoning, and did not analyze “reliance” interests as required by 
consistency doctrine); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 
1011, 1037–46 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing whether the 
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious). 
 337. Casa de Md. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758, 774 (D. Md. 2018). 
That court did, however, enjoin the department from utilizing information submitted by 
Dreamers in response to DACA.  
 338. See NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 238 (D.D.C. 2018) (“This scant legal 
reasoning was insufficient to satisfy the department’s obligation to explain its departure from its 
prior stated view that DACA was lawful.”); see also NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 473 
(D.D.C. 2018) (reconsidering DHS actions in light of a new government rationale, but adhering 
to earlier conclusions that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious). 
 339. See NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 249 (vacating the decision to rescind DACA, 
but staying the order of vacatur for ninety days to allow DHS to provide a better explanation); 
NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 467–69 (finding that the new government explanation still 
failed to provide a “sufficient basis” to revise the earlier judgment that the agency policy was 
rooted in error about “what the law requires,” and also rejecting “serious doubts” and “litigation 
risk” rationales due to how they could allow an agency to evade judicial review). 
 340. NCAAP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 249. 
 341. Id. 
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Rule exceeded the agencies’ statutory authority.342 The first court 
decision rejected the addition of a new “applicability date” that worked 
to suspend the Clean Water Rule’s requirements.343 The court in no 
way granted the agencies greater latitude to revise, rescind, or delay 
the 2015 finalized rule based on the abnegation claim. The court 
instead noted the agencies’ prohibition of merits comments (which was 
found to be unlawful), failures to comply with the APA’s procedural 
requirements, and neglect of consistency doctrine. Agencies may be 
able to change policy, the court recognized, but they must supply a 
“reasoned analysis,” allow meaningful opportunity for comment, and 
show “at least some fidelity to law and legal process.”344 Otherwise, 
“government [would] become ‘a matter of the whim and caprice of the 
bureaucracy.’”345 The court noted that its finding of legal infirmities 
was consistent with a raft of other rejections of “similarly hastily 
enacted rules.”346 This last comment appears to indicate an additional 
degree of judicial skepticism for agency policy changes that lack the 
usual factually driven and slow-moving deliberative process leading to 
regulatory change. 
In Bauer v. DeVos,347 the court rejected the Trump Department of 
Education’s effort to delay implementation of the 2016 “Borrower 
Defense Regulations.”348 The form of abnegation attempted there was 
a bit unusual and convoluted. The Department claimed that due to 
litigation challenges and other questions about the Borrower Defense 
Regulations, it would stay the regulations’ effective date under APA 
section 705, and due to that stay, a separate statutory provision, the 
“Master Calendar Provision,” required the agency (in its view) to delay 
any implementation of the Obama-era regulations until July 2019.349 
The department thus claimed it had no choice but to do so. The court 
rejected the department’s interpretation of section 705 as authorizing 
stays, its sidestepping of a statutory negotiated-rulemaking mandate, 
 
 342. These actions are introduced supra at notes 80–95 and accompanying text. 
 343. See S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 967 (D.S.C. 2018) 
(vacating the new “Suspension Rule” after finding it arbitrary and capricious). 
 344. Id. (quoting N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 772 (4th Cir. 
2012) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)). 
 345. Id. (quoting N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, 702 F.3d at 772 (Wilkinson, J., concurring)).  
 346. Id. at 965; see id. at 966 & n.2 (citing eight judicial decisions rejecting new agency rules). 
 347. Bauer v. DeVos, 325 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  
 348. Id. at 78–79. 
 349. Id. at 85 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1089(c)(1) (2012)). 
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and the claim that it had no choice but to provide a multiyear delay.350 
The court also noted that the department failed to provide a balanced 
comparative assessment of the effects of the implementation delay on 
those regulated and on students losing regulatory protections, explain 
inconsistencies in approaches under the 2016 regulations and the delay 
attempts, or engage rigorously with its own contrary legal analysis of 
the need for the Borrower Defense Regulations and its own regulatory 
powers.351 More than other cases, the court repeatedly criticized the 
department for leaving so much “unexplained.”352 Agencies must, the 
court stated, provide explanation “that will enable the court to evaluate 
the agency’s rationale.”353 Here, again, a court emphasized the 
importance of clear comparative legal explanation by the agency, in 
part so the court could fulfill its own role in ensuring that the agency 
had acted legally and through a process providing political 
accountability and legitimacy. 
In Pennsylvania v. Trump,354 the Department of Health and 
Human Services fared no better in defending an “interim final rule” 
that was issued without a preceding notice-and-comment process.355 
This new rule would have allowed employers to opt out of no-cost 
contraceptive coverage under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act.356 Here too, the agency relied on a mix of claims about 
inherent authority and its power under the APA, and on a new claim 
that it lacked discretion under the statute and hence had to reject its 
earlier action and provide the requested relief.357 The court rejected the 
agency’s construction of the APA, its view of statutory requirements 
for religious accommodation, and its interpretation of the Affordable 
 
 350. Id. at 95–96 (stating that although the department claimed its “hands were tied,” it was 
not given Chevron deference, and its reading of the “Master Calendar Provision” was invalid). 
 351. See id. at 96–110 (presenting and rejecting the department’s numerous arguments). 
 352. Id. at 100, 109–10. The court disagreed with the department’s claims about having no 
statutory choice and also disagreed with how the court construed substantive law and the APA. 
Id. at 95–96, 109. 
 353. Id. at 108 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990)). 
 354. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2017)  
 355. See id. at 585 (concluding “that a preliminary injunction [was] warranted” to enjoin the 
interim final rule). 
 356. Id. at 563. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at scattered sections at U.S.C. chs. 25, 26, & 42). 
 357. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 571–81. The agency claimed that due to the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the earlier administration’s provision of an 
“Accommodation Process” was illegal and required immediate action without the APA’s “time-
consuming notice and comment process.” Id. at 573. 
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Care Act.358 It concluded that the agency had failed to weigh 
congressional policy choices to protect women’s health in the Act.359 
The agency had to provide a full notice-and-comment process, as 
evidenced by the massive interest in the original policies and in 
response to the interim final rule.360 The agency’s concerns with 
“uncertainty” and “speculation, unsupported by the record” were 
inadequate to justify the agency’s actions.361 The court called the 
agency’s effort to “sidestep . . . the strictures of the notice and comment 
procedure . . . matryoshkanesque in its construction.”362 The agency’s 
reliance on three statutes to claim it had no choice was wholly 
rejected.363 
These opinions reviewing abnegation claims, all of which involved 
minimal agency engagement with past factual or scientific findings, 
past legal reasoning, or clear comparative analysis of the effects of the 
new and discarded or delayed regulation, reveal courts hewing to 
regulatory rule-of-law fundamentals. They also hew to what the 
Supreme Court has long required for an agency to justify a policy 
change.364 Agencies must address past reasoning, offer “good reasons” 
for their new choice, leave no unexplained inconsistency, address 
reliance interests or changes in conditions between the original and 
revised action or policy, and address all factual or scientific findings 
relevant to the original and revised action.365 No court excuses the 
required analysis in cases of abnegation. Similarly, although courts 
dutifully quote key language from administrative-law doctrine, 
including the usual room for presidents to pursue different regulatory 
priorities, none view conformity with the president’s wishes as 
shielding the agency from ordinary judicial scrutiny. None see this 
possibility of change and presidential agreement as legally adequate or, 
it appears, as even improving the agency’s odds of winning. Courts 
expect compliance with statutes’ substantive and procedural 
 
 358. Id. at 571–81.  
 359. See id. at 584 (stating in its discussion of the “balance of the equities” prong that 
“Congress has already struck the balance” to “bridge the significant gender gap in healthcare 
costs between men and women”). 
 360. Id. at 574. 
 361. Id. at 573–74. 
 362. Id. at 571. The court appears to be referring to this complicated, multistatute-based 
argument as akin to nesting Russian dolls. 
 363. Id. at 571–73 (rejecting the agency’s argument that a combination of statutes required 
the provision of religious relief and that the agency could bypass notice and comment). 
 364. See supra Part II.A.4 (setting forth key elements of consistency doctrine). 
 365. See supra notes 168–205 and accompanying text. 
BUZBEE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  4:08 PM 
1588  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1509 
requirements and look for indicia that agencies acted through 
“reasoned decisionmaking.” Political accountability in all of its forms 
remains essential.  
E. The “Why Bother” Rationale for Abnegation 
This section concludes the Article with analysis of the argument—
or perhaps the implicit assertion of abnegating agencies—that 
abnegation-based policy changes should be allowed without the usual 
rigorous comparative analysis called for by consistency doctrine. Why 
bother with all of that empirical analysis of on-the-ground effects and 
providing of “good reasons” for a change if the earlier action was 
rooted in an illegal claim of power? This section argues that courts 
should reject such an invitation to create a lesser burden of justification 
for policy changes involving abnegation. Abnegation claims will rarely 
truly be rooted in a claim of no power. Rather, most involve new claims 
of excess stringency or an agency changing its view about the range of 
potentially appropriate actions. And even if an abnegation claim of “no 
power whatsoever” might now and then be plausible, assessing that 
claim still requires the agency and reviewing courts to compare legal 
reasoning and how it relates to effects of the allegedly illegal past 
action and effects of the new, different view of agency power. 
Consistency doctrine’s analytical requirements logically should 
continue to apply even when an agency makes an apparently tenable 
abnegation claim. 
Most importantly, plausible disclaimers of agency power despite 
contrary earlier claims will be rare. It is notable that no agency 
asserting that it completely lacked the power previously claimed has 
yet (as of publication) elicited judicial agreement that the agency 
actually lacked all such power. Broad agency claims of complete lack 
of power are, upon examination, often in error; few laws contain such 
clear mandates or preclusions. Most abnegation actions involve 
political statements about past regulatory excess or an argument for a 
different regulatory approach. Several of the political rationales for 
lowered analytical hurdles for abnegating agencies—time savings, 
expedited deregulation, and avoidance of politically costly disclosure 
of the downsides of deregulation—are completely untenable if the 
agency has options about how to act. Uniform Supreme Court 
precedent requires full agency engagement and explanation for policy 
change in a setting where several choices are possible; agencies must 
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provide an assessment of their relative impacts.366 If a new choice is 
better or equally appropriate under the law and relevant facts, the 
policy shift might be possible, but the agency must justify such a 
comparative claim. Policy choice, not complete lack of power, is the 
norm. And agencies must explain and justify a new choice. 
Even if an agency makes a tenable claim that the earlier regulatory 
action was illegal, that claim often focuses on a particular manner of 
regulating, perhaps due to a claim of unjustifiable stringency or that 
the earlier regulation relied on a regulatory tool or mode later viewed 
as inappropriate. In these settings, the possibly tenable claim of 
illegality would not mean that the agency lacks any power to act. The 
agency would still need to explain what it will or can do with the power 
that it does have, explain its different statutory construction, and show 
how its new choice conforms to the statutory power that is conferred 
(as newly construed). Because statutory interpretation usually involves 
a language component first, then assessment of triggers (or reasons) 
for an agency action, and then explanation for the responsive action 
taken, the new approach must still be shown to conform to law in light 
of relevant effects and statutory criteria and goals. With these sorts of 
illegality claims, comparative analysis remains essential for courts to 
fulfill their reviewing role. 
For example, EPA included abnegation-based claims when it 
proposed to roll back or replace the CPP, but it nonetheless was acting 
in an area of clear statutory authority to regulate power plants for their 
GHG emissions.367 Its shift to a different view of permissible regulatory 
tools cannot be assessed without some analysis of the comparative 
effects of the new and old claims of power, since the statute still 
requires the agency to regulate based on assessment of the “best 
system” of “emission reduction.”368 EPA might have latitude to 
reconceive of what it views as “best” and able to be regulated, but 
 
 366. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 367. For example, EPA has long regulated power-plant emissions. The Supreme Court 
alluded to EPA’s power to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions under section 111(d) of the Clean 
Air Act in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423–25 (2011). EPA under 
the Trump administration still does not wholly disclaim power. The Trump EPA claimed it had 
to regulate “inside the fenceline” and disavowed authority to limit pollution levels to what could 
be achieved with “generation shifting,” which took into account actions outside of individual 
facilities. See supra notes 56–79 and accompanying text. 
 368. See supra notes 56–66 and accompanying text (presenting the genesis of and statutory 
basis offered for the CPP). 
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consideration of “emission reduction[s]” achievable under both views 
of EPA power would remain a relevant consideration. 
To distill this point, even if Regulatory Tool A were rightly 
claimed to be illegal, that does not logically (or under current doctrine, 
legally) excuse the agency from fully explaining its later embrace of 
Regulatory Tool B where the source of risk still remains subject to 
regulation. And because language and an action’s rationale and effects 
are all relevant to an agency’s power, consistency doctrine’s 
requirements would still make sense, even if a court might ultimately 
agree that Regulatory Tool A was illegal. Comparative analysis and 
justification would remain essential to allow for judicial assessment of 
the agency’s new, different choice. 
Only if an agency could tenably claim no power whatsoever to act 
in a realm could one anticipate that courts might be tempted to relieve 
agencies of their usual consistency-doctrine analytical hurdles. None of 
the abnegation examples involve such total-lack-of-power claims; the 
closest example (although quite dubious) was EPA’s claim it had no 
power at all to regulate reconstructed and refurbished trucks in the 
“Glider” rule.369 Even if the agency’s earlier position was rooted in 
consideration of the effects of some activity seemingly beyond the 
agency’s reach, or in the use of some allegedly prohibited regulatory 
method or tool, then the new agency position—that it has no power to 
regulate—would logically need to engage on these very points in order 
to explain itself. Again, consistency doctrine’s call for comparative 
reasoning, “good reasons,” and engagement on issues of underlying 
science and fact makes sense. 
Moreover, an analytical carveout for “no power whatsoever” 
abnegation claims would foment strategic agency efforts to dodge the 
burdens of transparent and comparative agency analysis, and leave 
reviewing courts without critical information. Recognizing such a 
carveout with attendant reduced analytical burdens would require 
courts to draw lines between permissible bare abnegation-based policy 
shifts and policy changes subject to the usual comparative analysis 
required by consistency doctrine. In the closely analogous City of 
Arlington case, the Supreme Court declined to treat differently claims 
that an agency acted outside its jurisdiction and claims of other sorts of 
 
 369. See supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text (tracing the glider rule’s history). 
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agency illegality.370 Such distinctions, the Court concluded, would 
cause endless strategic maneuvering and confusion.371 
Similarly, despite the possibility of rare, sound agency claims of 
complete lack of power, courts should reject entreaties for a new 
abnegation exception from consistency doctrine. The lines between 
excess stringency, alleged use of an illegal tool where an agency does 
have power, and a claim of no power whatsoever will often be a 
continuum. Rarely will effects of agency power claims and choices be 
irrelevant. The enduring body of law governing agency policy change 
remains sound and logical. No abnegation exception to agency 
obligations to engage in “reasoned decisionmaking” and conform to 
consistency doctrine should be created. 
CONCLUSION 
Although numerous agencies during 2017 and 2018 asserted 
statutory-abnegation justifications for deregulation, they did so with 
consistent inattention to substantive and procedural statutory 
requirements in both the APA and enabling acts. They also generally 
made little or no effort to satisfy the long-established requirements for 
reasoned agency decisionmaking and for agency policy change under 
consistency doctrine. Governing doctrine and the first wave of judicial 
rejections of statutory abnegation reveal little sympathy for this novel 
and previously uncommon rationale for an agency policy change. 
These widely trumpeted deregulatory actions may have been good 
politics, but so far they have come up short under the law. Political 
accountability in all of its forms matters. Agencies making hasty, 
unreasoned, and conclusory claims that they lack power may gain quick 
political credit. Such new claims of no agency power may also provide 
benefits for those left less regulated due to the abnegation claim and 
the related—but likely temporary—regulatory rollback. For enduring 
policy change, however, current doctrine wisely requires the same full 
process, deliberation, and sound legal and factual grounding that has 
always preceded successful agency policymaking. 
 
 370. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297–98 (2013). 
 371. Id.  
